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ABSTRACT 
 
Lauren Biddle: Corruption in Democratic Brazil 
(Under the direction of Jonathan Hartlyn) 
 
This three article-style dissertation analyzes several major facets of bureaucratic 
corruption using information collected in over two and half years of field research. The case 
that I focus on to investigate these questions is Brazil, a middle-income, democratic country 
with high levels of corruption, where both past and present issues of corruption have 
dominated the public discourse. Two articles are mainly based on quantitative data, while the 
third is an institutional analysis of an anti-corruption agency. In the first article, I explore the 
determinants of sub-national corruption patterns, including socio-economic and political 
factors through regression analysis. I find that corruption overall is most prevalent in areas 
where resources for public accountability are low and political competition incentivizes corrupt 
tactics. Next, I look at what factors shape citizens’ corruption perceptions with respect to their 
sub-national governments through an investigation of political attitudes, individual 
characteristics and environmental factors. I compare different measures of corruption in a 
multi-level model, including perception, performance and victimization, and discuss the 
benefits and drawbacks of these measures. I found that citizens do perceive more corruption 
where higher rates of corruption in local government are detected, and especially when they 
are politically disempowered and otherwise marginalized. In the third article, I examine a major 
anti-corruption agency’s efforts to combat corruption through the use of interview, 
observational and archival data. I find that horizontal mechanisms to combat corruption are 
disabled by a lack of enforcement, which coupled with high levels of detection, may reinforce 
the culture of impunity.
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INTRODUCTION 
Corruption, in a world of states struggling to improve democracy, is often a systemic problem.  
Because of this, it is useful to examine it at different levels of analysis in order to understand better how 
it functions in a given society. The major goals of the research agenda presented here are to examine 
definitions and measures of corruption, identify what conditions make corruption more likely, 
understand how citizens see corruption, and evaluate the effectiveness of anti-corruption programs. 
This is done through the examination of the case of Brazil, which illustrates the issues involved in 
improving democracy in an environment where corruption has been a long-standing impediment 
towards improved governance and participation. This is a situation common to many newer 
democracies in Latin America, Africa and elsewhere. Within this context, I explore the connection 
between the conceptualization of corruption and how best to measure it. I also look at corruption at the 
national and the subnational level, taking into account the institutional framework in which it operates. 
Thus, this analysis includes data on individual corruption attitudes, municipal-level corruption data, 
national and regional patterns of corruption, and the federal institutional structure of anti-corruption 
agencies.
In the first article, I explore the determinants of sub-national corruption patterns, including 
socio-economic, political and structural features. Next, I look at what factors shape citizens’ corruption 
perceptions with respect to their sub-national governments, including respondents’ attitudes and 
municipal characteristics. I also compare different measures of corruption and discuss their benefits and 
drawbacks. In the third article, I examine a major anti-corruption agency’s efforts to combat corruption 
within the national governance framework. Among my major conclusions are that corruption is most 
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prevalent in areas where resources for public accountability are low and political competition 
incentivizes corrupt tactics. I also find that citizens do perceive more corruption where higher rates of 
corruption in local government are detected, and especially when they are politically disempowered. I 
find that horizontal mechanisms to combat corruption are disabled by a lack of enforcement, which 
coupled with high levels of detection, may reinforce the culture of impunity and disempowerment. 
In the paragraphs below, first I briefly summarize the reasons for my case selection. Then, I 
describe the main findings of these articles, discuss further how they relate and outline some future 
areas of study.      
 Studying corruption through examining a single country makes it possible to isolate the political 
and socio-economic factors that cause corruption to vary sub-nationally. Instead of viewing corruption 
as a single phenomenon that can be measured as a national characteristic, this approach looks at 
political corruption as a particular pattern of interactions that is created by a certain environment. 
Instead of assuming that the phenomenon of corruption is the same in all countries and throughout all 
countries, I examine a particular pattern of corruption in a particular place and time. This avoids the 
issue of whether or not corruption definitions are constant cross-nationally, a problem often cited in 
corruption research. It also provides a more dynamic interpretation of the forces impacting corruption, 
helping to explain why it varies over time and region. This analysis presents corruption as the product of 
actors’ decisions and interests and the constraints provided by their environment, not just as an artifact 
of historical factors or an institutional configuration. As an approach, this method allows us to produce 
generalizations about a single case and generate inferences that may be relevant to other countries. 
Brazil provides an excellent case for such research as corruption is a highly salient issue, especially in the 
context of deepening democracy as it moves into its second quarter-century. Brazil also exhibits 
significant within-country variation in corruption levels, as well as high levels of decentralization. The 
Brazilian government has made several efforts to combat corruption, though the problem remains 
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entrenched. Finally, the information that these government programs have collected provides a rich 
source of data on corruption within the country. 
 I completed over two years of fieldwork in Brazil, during which I gathered most of the data for 
this project. In this time, I spent more than ten weeks in five different municipalities observing audit 
programs run by the government anti-corruption agency examined in the third paper. I further read and 
coded reports from over 750 of these audits, to create a nation-wide database of errors in municipal 
governance for use primarily in my first article. I interviewed more than 25 employees of this anti-
corruption agency, in two different states and at the national headquarters in Brasília. Further, for 
comparison between government organizations, I spoke with several analysts working on anti-
corruption programs in other branches of the federal government. These interviews of civil servants, 
along with extensive archival research and reviews of news coverage, provided the basis for my third 
article. In order to understand public attitudes, I began by speaking with leaders and members of five 
different citizen-run, non-governmental organizations that work to combat corruption. Later, in four 
municipalities, I completed 120 interviews with the public to provide the basic data for my second 
article, discussed below. I also spoke with dozens of Brazilian academics from several different 
disciplines working on issues of corruption and legitimacy in order to better situate my research within 
the Brazilian context.     
In the first article, using a performance-based measure of corruption created from municipal 
audits, I find that both socio-economic and political factors affect the pattern of corruption across the 
country. Specifically, I found that municipalities with lower average education and higher poverty levels 
are linked with higher corruption, as is expected from previous cross-national studies. However, 
contrary to initial expectations, local media presence had no significant impact in the municipalities 
studied, while higher municipal population had a negative effect on corruption. This is likely because 
local media lacks independence, especially in small towns. I further determined that increased 
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fragmentation in the town council and increased competitiveness in mayoral races are associated with 
higher corruption. Having a mayor from an anti-corruption party, the Worker’s Party (PT), had only a 
weakly significant effect on lowering corruption. The size of the public sector was negatively related to 
corruption rates. Instead of a large public sector generating corruption by stifling competition, as I saw 
during my fieldwork, poorly funded municipalities have little resources or expertise to detect or deter 
corruption, allowing it to thrive.  Finally, there were also increased levels of corruption found in the 
election year. Overall, I believe the most interesting finding is that political variables matter; the 
dynamic of a fragmented political system with high competition, citizens with low ability to detect and 
punish corruption and a public sector with limited resources all create the ideal conditions for 
corruption to thrive.    
  In the second article, I examine how three different types of corruption measures, perceptions, 
victimization and performance, relate. Using audit and interview data from four Brazilian municipalities, 
I created a multi-level model of the determinants of individual perceptions of corruption.  I find that 
experience with corruption is not significantly linked to individuals’ perceptions of corruption, while the 
corruption rate in municipal-level government is positively linked with perceptions. I also find that age, 
trust in institutions, support for the incumbent government, political information and assessment of 
government performance all have significant effects on individual-level corruption perceptions. More 
specifically, younger, more informed citizens are likely to see more corruption. Those less trusting of 
societal institutions, more dissatisfied with municipal performance and opposition voters are also more 
likely to perceive higher municipal corruption. Overall, I consider that the most important finding is that 
corruption rates based on municipal performance are positively and significantly related to citizens’ 
perceptions of corruption, while corruption victimization is not a significant determinant of perceptions. 
This means that corruption perception and victimization should not be treated as interchangeable 
measures. It also enhances the validity of performance-based corruption measures.  
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 The final article examines the premier executive anti-corruption agency in Brazil, the 
Controladoria-Geral da União (CGU), which was a particular focus of my research. Indeed, as noted 
above, I used its reports of municipal corruption audits to create the performance-based measure of 
corruption that I utilize in my first two articles. These audits are one way that the CGU performs 
detection, one of the three key functions of an anti-corruption agency, along with enforcement and 
prevention. However, my analysis shows that overall, the CGU has a limited impact on corruption. I find 
that despite a clearly-stated mandate to combat corruption and high resources to do so, the 
organization is only successful in the detection of corruption. Enforcement and prevention mechanisms 
are weak by design, a legacy of the way that the institution was created. Despite various cycles of 
reform by two presidents, the CGU failed to become more effective on enforcement nor was there 
substantial progress on corruption prevention. I argue that these reforms and even the CGU’s creation 
were intended to give the appearance of combatting corruption while actually largely maintaining the 
status quo. When faced with public and Congressional pressures to act on combatting corruption, 
especially while under electoral tensions, the executive reacted to diffuse these demands by 
manipulating the CGU. The result is an agency that is largely responsive to executive interests: it focuses 
on corruption at municipal- and state-levels and produces high quality information, but it does not have 
significant enforcement power and does not pursue substantial anti-corruption reforms. Due to these 
characteristics, the overall impact of the CGU in actually combating corruption is not significant. 
 Taken together, these three articles contribute to a research agenda on understanding 
corruption throughout a particular country case in order not only to understand that country case as 
well as identify systematic subnational variations within it, but also to provide hypotheses that may be 
tested in other similar country cases. The analysis of the CGU shows how even at the executive-level, 
efforts to combat corruption in Brazil are stymied by a system that offers perverse incentives to allow 
corruption to persist as a tactic to obtain political and personal goals. Similarly, in the context of poor, 
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less-educated municipalities with fewer public resources, corruption becomes a tactic used to respond 
to fragmentation, competition and electoral pressures. These pressures also make corruption harder to 
deter. Individual citizens perceive this corruption, especially when they feel excluded from the political 
system; the lack of enforcement and prevention mechanisms then create a culture of impunity. The 
public sees corruption but feels powerless to do anything about it, especially as elections in a context of 
imperfect information and high competition and fragmentation return corrupt politicians to office. 
Horizontal and vertical accountability mechanisms to deter corruption are both flawed. 
Brazil’s corruption problem, as shown by this research, is quite deep. It reaches into the majority 
of municipalities and through the other levels of government. The problem is recognized by citizens and 
may shape their political behavior, affecting democracy. While both citizens and politicians claim to 
want less corruption, we see here that other considerations tend to trump even good faith efforts. This 
inertia leads through several different mechanisms to a lack of progress in reducing corruption levels. 
Some citizens may believe that all politicians are corrupt, and thus “hold their nose” but continue to 
vote for corrupt candidates. Other citizens may want to punish corrupt politicians but find that other 
issues are more important when they stand at the ballot box. Public servants may be against corruption 
but may have little power to identify and act on corruption within their own offices. Politicians may 
campaign for office promising to combat corruption but find that the only way to win is to engage in 
corrupt practices common among candidates. Or effective anti-corruption programs may be too costly 
to politicians’ personal goals and futures even once in office. 
     One major contribution of these articles is the examination of corruption detection and 
measurement. In my institutional analysis, I find that the CGU is not an effective anti-corruption agency 
because it does not act credibly on enforcement and prevention. However, I find that the agency is 
successful in detecting corruption, especially through their municipal audit program. The reports from 
this program provide one of the main measures of corruption utilized in the first two articles. This 
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performance-based measure of corruption provides, with victimization and perception, yet another way 
to quantify underlying corruption levels. The advantage of this measure is that it is well-suited for 
studying sub-national corruption since it is collected by a single agency, with a standard methodology, 
and through a process insulated from political influences. This measure is significantly related to citizen 
perceptions of corruption, which helps to further validate both measures. When higher levels of 
corruption in local government are detected through audits, citizen perceptions of corruption are also 
likely to be higher. This could be a hopeful sign for eventually enhancing vertical accountability since it 
indicates that citizens do have some accurate information on corruption, which if activated could be 
used to de-incentivize local corruption. Some possible mechanisms for this effect could be local 
watchdog groups or popular mobilizations that act to educate and monitor the public about corruption, 
enhancing the possibility for electoral accountability.  
 In these articles, I examine several different aspects of the nature of corruption in Brazil and 
efforts to combat it. Understanding the determinants of individual-level perceptions of corruption, the 
factors associated with municipal-level corruption and the flaws of the anti-corruption agency provide 
some insight into why this problem is so intractable. A mixture of socio-economic and political factors 
creates an environment that allows corruption to exist and hinders efforts to curtail it. None of these 
factors is easily or quickly changed and their interdependence complicates efforts even more. Further 
research may build on these findings to try to unravel this complicated knot, perhaps through examining 
lessons learned in other countries. One suggested area for future examination is the consequences of 
corruption for democracy in this context. For example, how much does corruption actually affect 
political behavior, such as voting, party affiliation or protest? Is behavior only affected by perceptions 
measures or does it also relate to performance-based measures? And does the level of government 
matter? Another area of investigation suggested by this research is evaluating specific anti-corruption 
programs for their efficacy. For example, do courses intended to improve the probity and transparency 
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of local government officials affect municipal corruption measures? Do citizen awareness and education 
programs worsen or improve levels of corruption perceptions? Do prevention programs lead citizens to 
change their political behaviors, such as voting, organization or protest? All of these questions are 
relevant to debates among public policy makers and academics. Only by studying corruption 
systemically can we better understand its causes and effects; and perhaps eventually, how to combat it.   
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CHAPTER 1: CAUSES OF MUNICIPAL CORRUPTION: THE CASE OF BRAZIL 
 
Introduction 
 Decentralization has been championed by advisors to many governments in Latin America and 
throughout the developing world as a way to make local governments more responsive and accountable 
to their citizens. However, in countries where corruption is endemic, local governments may be highly 
vulnerable to elite capture and the development of networks of corrupt influence, which may actually 
compound their problems. Currently, there is relatively little data on corruption at the subnational level. 
In addition, while the causes of corruption at the national level have been widely studied, there is a lack 
of information on the correlates of corruption within countries. In this paper, I use a dataset I created 
based on information from municipal audits in Brazil, the Biddle Brazil Corruption Database, to identify 
risk factors associated with corruption. Brazil, a large, diverse country with strong decentralized 
government and a long history of problems with political corruption provides an important and 
informative laboratory for examining this problem. This is particularly true as it exhibits significant 
within country variation in corruption levels and different types of potential explanatory factors. 
Informed by cross-national research and aware of the particular local context of the Brazilian case, this 
analysis finds that education and poverty act as expected based on cross-national research to decrease 
and increase, respectively, municipal corruption rates. Surprisingly, I find that the specific characteristics 
of this subnational level analysis provide results on the role of the media, size of the public sector, 
urbanization and political competition that are not predicted by current cross-national research. I also 
find that government fragmentation, political ideology of government and election cycle all have 
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significant effects on subnational corruption, which adds a new dimension to this research that cross-
national studies have not examined.   The first contribution of this paper is that it examines corruption 
at a lower level of analysis than commonly utilized in previous research. Studying corruption on a 
subnational level allows us to explore the micro-foundations of this phenomenon in a way that cross-
national investigations cannot, emphasizing contextual political dynamics and social climate. For 
example, most previous studies of corruption define the phenomena as “the improper use of public 
office for private gain”.1 Because corruption must be improper, it is rooted to a particular understanding 
based on local attitudes and norms. Studying corruption cross-nationally becomes complex when the 
same act can be interpreted differently across cultures as norms vary. What is considered corrupt in one 
context may not be considered corrupt in another, especially if corruption is quantified using 
perceptions data. By selecting a single country of analysis, we can control for these major cultural 
differences in views. In addition, major historical factors, such as legacy of colonization and ethno-
linguistic fractionalization, are also held constant through this approach.  
Further, analyzing patterns of corruption within a country by necessity requires us to identify 
causal factors that cross-national studies do not, adding to our understanding of why corruption occurs. 
Some of the most important characteristics that are commonly associated with corruption in cross-
national research include presidential vs. parliamentary, federal vs. unitary, proportional representation 
vs. majoritarian voting systems, and type of legal system. However, these remain constant within a 
country, and thus cannot explain variation in local corruption patterns. Macroeconomic characteristics, 
such as trade, structural reforms and resource exports, are also ineffective for the same reason.2 
However, though the above variables do not explain within-country variance, cross-national research on 
                                                          
1
 This definition of corruption, though widely used and accepted within the literature, is not without controversy. 
See Johnston 2002 and 2005, Warren 2004 and 2006, and Kurer 2005 for a discussion of some alternative ways to 
define corruption.  
2
 In Brazil, some resource royalties are distributed to a few municipalities. However, federal transfers make up far 
more of municipal budgets in general, so any “resource curse” effect would be negligible.  
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the correlates of corruption does hint at several possible factors affecting subnational corruption. 
Informed by this research, I investigate a variety of political and economic variables, including economic 
development, education, media influence, size of public sector, urbanization and political competition. 
Factors specific to this subnational analysis include government partisan ideology, political 
fragmentation and election cycle.  
The second major contribution of this paper, in addition to identifying subnational factors 
affecting local corruption, is in creating and utilizing a measure that richly captures subnational 
corruption. The measure that I create contributes to the growing literature on performance-based 
measures of corruption, which are created relying on outside evaluations of government programs that 
identify compliance with institutional rules and principles for the proper use of public office. They can be 
used as proxies for corruption because they identify when government agents go against the rules of 
their profession for private gain. In this study, I used government audit data on Brazilian municipalities 
to construct a detailed indicator for the rate of corruption in local government. 
While corruption is manifested in all types of societies throughout the world, this problem has 
been particularly serious in Brazil, where its historical persistence and many recent well-publicized 
episodes of corruption have given the country a reputation for dishonest political dealings (Geddes & 
Ribeiro Neto 1992, 647-9; Samuels 2001a, 2001b; Hunter & Power 2007). In addition, Brazil has a 
candidate-centered presidential system with a federal structure, making it practically a perfect storm of 
institutional factors believed to foster corruption, based on cross-national research (Rose-Ackerman 
2001; Gerring & Thacker 2004; Chang 2005). According to a Latinobarómetro public opinion survey 
carried out in 2005, Brazilians think that on average 62% of public officials are corrupt, compared to the 
regional average of 68% (30). According to the 2010 version of the Latinobarómetro survey, 26% of 
Brazilian reported that they or a family member had heard of a corrupt act in the past year, compared to 
a regional average of 11% (2010, 95). Despite Brazil’s high levels of corruption internationally, according 
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to these surveys, it falls in the middle range when compared to all the countries in Latin America, though 
it does outstrip roughly comparable rivals, such as Argentina (Latinobarómetro 2006). Every year the 
Brazilian government spends millions to try to combat corruption, with less than satisfactory results.  If 
the effects of corruption include lost growth and wasted investments, as shown by many studies, Brazil 
has paid and continues to pay a heavy economic penalty for its political maladies. If the effects of 
corruption are detrimental to deepening democracy, through decreasing legitimacy and participation,3 
Brazil’s great project of inclusion, equality and liberty established in the 1988 Constitution may lag 
behind its potential. Overall, the Brazilian case is extremely compelling for this project since it unites 
current salience and importance of corruption issues with a historical legacy of corruption and the 
challenges of deepening democracy. Additionally, Brazil’s institutional configurations make it ideal for 
exploring the causes of subnational corruption patterns, employing the Biddle Brazil Corruption 
Database. 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. I first discuss the differences between 
examining corruption on the macro- and micro- levels, illustrating what can be gained from micro-level 
research. Next, I use an actor-centered approach to explore what conditions affect corrupt behaviors, 
broadly dividing these forces into permissive and proximate factors. Using previous research as a 
starting point, I identify the potential correlates of subnational corruption. Then I portray some forms of 
corruption found in the cases of interest, Brazilian municipalities, in order to introduce a discussion of 
how best to measure this phenomenon, the key dependent variable of interest. I describe how the 
measurement was created, and elaborate on the characteristics and distribution of the measure. After 
briefly clarifying how the data on my independent variables was collected, I present the results of the 
statistical model. The discussion of the results evaluates what support for the proposed hypotheses the 
                                                          
3
 See, for example, Anderson and Tverdova (2003), on the role of corruption in determining legitimacy. 
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model provides, and interprets these findings. In conclusion, I use the results of my analysis to suggest 
some possible future avenues of research.  
 
Micro- vs. macro- corruption 
As corruption is a complex phenomenon that is manifested in a variety of different ways, it is a 
challenge to create a grand theory of its causes at all levels of analysis. Rational actor explanations are 
the starting point for many theories about which factors relate to corruption. However, these theories 
about individual behavior should be used with caution, especially when extrapolating to larger units of 
analysis. The assumption that individual choices and behavior can be aggregated may be problematic; 
group dynamics are not always directly deductible from individual choices. Because of this concern, it is 
productive to look at an actor-based theory of corruption. Studying corruption at the municipal level 
brings one closer to the modal political actors (citizens), which may help to explain apparent paradoxes 
that aggregated models cannot.4 As corruption is defined as the improper use of public office for private 
gain, it necessarily takes into account individual behavior. Examining municipal corruption moves the 
analysis closer to the decisions of actors, their incentives and disincentives, the rules that bind them and 
opportunity structures within a given context. Moving up the unit of analysis, findings about corruption 
sub-nationally may reinforce the validity of cross-national studies by illuminating mechanisms by which 
the causal variables actually affect corruption. In addition, dropping down to a lower level of analysis 
may help clarify the direction of causation among associated factors in future research. 
While this article does not directly address corruption involving presidential, ministerial or 
legislative agents, some useful inferences about these can be developed by analyzing the local level. 
Municipalities have governing structures, called prefeituras, that are analogous to those at other levels 
of government. Like many national systems, these municipalities each possess an executive (mayor), a 
                                                          
4
 For example, the counterintuitive evidence that while voters in Brazil complain about corrupt officials, they 
consistently act against these interests in re-electing corruption politicians. 
 
 
14 
 
legislature (town council), a bureaucracy (city administration), political parties and citizens-voters. The 
types of corruption produced under this institutional configuration may hold similarities to corruption 
patterns at higher levels. In addition, due to high levels of federalism, “the ills currently afflicting the 
federal government are also present in lower tiers of government, so that the three tiers cross-infect 
each other with corrupt practices” (Macaulay 2011, 222). Thus, wider implications for this research may 
be found at the national or even cross-national level.  
Understanding corruption in subnational governments as a phenomenon in itself may be more 
important than it appears at first glance. While the amounts of money or goods at stake on the 
municipal level may not be large and the news stories may not be as sensational, this type of corruption 
still has serious consequences. It can prevent citizens from fully exercising their rights, erode overall 
trust and legitimacy, decrease participation and affect political behavior.  For many average citizens, the 
municipal government and its service providers are the front-line and perhaps their only contact with 
the state apparatus. All but a small percentage of citizens in any country will never have contact with 
government at the ministerial or presidential level; but many citizens will receive municipal garbage 
services, visit a community health clinic, register for social security benefits or attend a public school. 
Corruption experience in these arenas can shape their political ideas in ways that corruption higher in 
government may not, especially if this type of corruption remains hidden. Citizens may have greater 
interest in, or more access to, information about local corruption, through direct experience, social 
networks or community media, making it more salient in their overall views of the regime. Thus, if and 
when corruption works to degrade democratic quality and retard democratic development, municipal-
level corruption may have a disproportionate effect relative to national-level corruption. Empirical 
research shows that even in the case of so-called petty offenses, “exposure to corruption erodes belief 
in the political system and reduces interpersonal trust” (Seligson 2002b, 408). 
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Explaining subnational corruption  
To examine the causes of municipal corruption, I begin by looking at actors and the conditions 
that facilitate and inhibit their opting for corrupt behavior.5 The opportunity for an actor to indulge in 
corrupt behavior varies. Some types of situations or roles are more conducive to corrupt acts; others 
work to reduce the opportunities for wrongdoing. For example, an agent that handles more public 
contracts may be more often approached with corrupt offers; his opportunity is greater. In addition to 
their opportunity for corrupt acts, actors’ decisions about whether or not to indulge in corrupt behavior 
are influenced by several important factors. These include:  
1. their beliefs about the likelihood they will be caught; 
2. their beliefs about the severity of punishment they will receive if caught; and 
3. their beliefs about the potential rewards of the corrupt act. 
Based on the elementary assumptions above, I divide my explanatory variables roughly into two groups: 
permissive and proximate variables.  Permissive (or facilitative) factors are those variables that may 
affect corruption levels by conditioning the basic environment and thus the basic possibility for 
corruption. These factors provide the fertile or barren ground in which corruption may or may not 
flourish. These mostly socio-economic factors include level of economic development, level of 
education, population and size of the public sector. These factors permit corruption because they 
provide an environment where the resources for detection and punishment are low and the incentives 
for corruption are high. Permissive factors are the most difficult to alter in the short-term and are also 
the most likely to be resistant to efforts to clean up corruption. The second set of factors includes more 
proximal variables. These are mostly political variables, including political competition, local media 
                                                          
5
 This approach to explaining corruption is based on the public choice literature. See Rose-Ackerman (1999) for a 
good summary of research using this approach to studying corruption. 
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presence and party in power.6 These explanatory factors more directly affect the beliefs of the actors 
about the likely quality of oversight and the political will to uncover and punish corruption. When actors 
believe that they will not be punished, it is presumed that they may indulge in corruption more often. 
The two sets of factors, permissive and proximate, are related and both may affect opportunity, 
rewards, detection and punishment. However, we conceive permissive factors to work more directly on 
opportunity and rewards, and proximal factors to work more directly on beliefs about detection and 
punishment.  
 
Permissive factors 
To identify the factors that are permissive of corruption, it is useful to begin with past research 
on corruption causes cross-nationally.7 In these studies, depending on the time period, countries and 
measures of the dependent variable utilized, many different factors appear to significantly affect levels 
of corruption through their impact on the structure of rewards and opportunities. Only a few are 
consistent across most studies, indicating that conditional relationships or causal heterogeneity could be 
at work.  However, several factors often emerge as key permissive variables that may also be applicable 
in explaining subnational corruption.  
                                                          
6 There is also a possibility that other variables may impact municipal corruption, especially the strength of civil 
society and the network of local associations, crime rates, rule of law and informality.  However, all of these 
variables are problematic in one way or another.  Strength of civil society cannot be directly measured in the cases 
analysed here, and it is unclear which types of associations could have a positive and/or negative effect.  Density of 
civil society itself could be an indicator of “insider politics”, exaggerated patronage networks or clientelistic 
tendencies that may actually foster more corruption instead of checking it.  Crime rates and rule of law variables 
are too intertwined with measures of corruption itself and could present the problem of tautological explanations 
or statistical collinearity.  Finally, informality is highly correlated both with rule of law and inequality.  
7
 Some relevant articles that use quantitative methods to examine the causes of corruption cross-nationally 
include Ades & Di Tella 1999; Husted 1999; Sandholtz & Koetzle 2000; Treisman 2000; Montinola & Jackman 2002; 
Ali & Isse 2003; Graeff & Mehlkop 2003; Power & González 2003; Davis, Camp & Coleman 2004; Gerring & Thacker 
2004; Sung 2004; Chang 2005; Tavits 2007; Lindstedt & Naurin 2010; Brown, Touchton & Whitford 2011. On Brazil, 
see Geddes & Ribeiro Neto 1992; and Pereira, Melo & Figueiredo 2009.   
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 The first relevant permissive variable is level of economic development.8 Higher levels of 
development are generally linked to lower levels of corruption.9 According to cross-national research, in 
richer countries, the normative separation between public and private is clearer and more economic 
competition and opportunities provide viable alternatives to corruption (Treisman 2000).  Another 
explanation is that countries with more developed economies have higher quality governments, which 
are associated with lower perceived corruption (Treisman 2000, 401). Countries at lower levels of 
development are thought to be less likely to possess the expertise and ability to create the proper 
mechanisms for effective government oversight of corruption.10  
The dynamics of poverty may provide the clearest mechanism for why low economic 
development is associated with higher corruption. According to the World Bank,  
Corruption thrives in an environment where power of individual members of society 
measured in terms of access to people in power and financial resources supercedes the rule 
of law. The poor lack power and thus lack opportunity to “make it” in such a society. They 
are more vulnerable to extortion and cannot use corruption in their favor.11   
 
                                                          
8
 Two further economic variables examined in cross-national studies of corruption are trade openness and 
resource dependence. The argument for the role of trade openness is that corruption should be lower in more 
open systems because competition penalizes bribe-taking, fewer decisions are in the hands of corrupt government 
officials and international rational norms of administration spread through increased contact (Montinola & 
Jackman 2002, 153; Sandholtz & Koetzle 2000, 39-40). With resource dependence, countries with large 
endowments of valuable raw materials – especially fuel, ore, and metal – are expected to have higher levels of 
corruption because corruption in these sectors offers greater potential gain to officials who control the rights for 
exploitation (Ades & Di Tella 1999, 992). These two variables were not examined in this study, as they are decided 
and have deeper effects at the national as opposed to local level. They are not expected to significantly affect 
municipal corruption. 
9
 There is also a possible reverse causal relationship between development and corruption, as Mauro (1995) 
suggests that high levels of corruption are a deterrent to foreign investment, though this is hypothesized to be less 
relevant than the relationships discussed above. 
10
 Indirectly, economic development may act on corruption through its effect on public sector wages. Montinola 
and Jackman state that less economically developed countries generally have lower public sector wages, which 
may increase incentives for state employees to engage in illegal rent-seeking activities to supplement their low 
income (2002, 154). However, evidence for this aspect of the argument is not without controversy. La Porta et al. 
find that relatively low government wages actually lead to better government performance (1999, 239). 
11
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPUBLICSECTORANDGOVERNANCE/EXTANTICORRUPTI
ON/0contentMDK:20222075~menuPK:384473~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:384455~isCURL:Y,00.html. 
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 In the context of Brazilian municipalities, corruption may be more attractive in impoverished regions 
because “where incomes are low, economic insecurity, if not outright poverty means that marginal 
additions to income can have a large impact on a family’s living conditions” (Sandholtz & Koetzle 2000, 
36). In Brazilian municipalities, income is often highly unequally distributed. Therefore the standard 
measure of economic development, gross domestic product per capita of a municipality, may not 
capture the key concept of what part of the population is more vulnerable due to economic factors. 
When a municipality is highly unequal, with much of the population living in poverty and wealth highly 
concentrated, GDP per capita would not capture the permissive effect of economics on corruption.12 
Thus, I use poverty rate instead to capture this effect. Poverty rates vary widely across municipalities 
and I hypothesize that they affect the environmental possibilities for corruption through the above 
mechanisms. Where there is a larger portion of the population living in poverty, the motivation for 
corruption is greater and the marginal reward may be higher. While poverty and economic development 
may be linked, especially cross-nationally, in this case, I expect the most relevant relationship to be that 
lower levels of poverty should lead to lower levels of municipal corruption.13 
 A second permissive factor for sub-national corruption generated from cross-national research 
is education. According to previous research, higher levels of education in a society should decrease the 
levels of corruption. A more educated population should provide fewer opportunities for corruption 
through ignorance. As a population becomes more educated, it should be able to consume and process 
more sophisticated political information. Indirectly, education gives citizens more tools to identify and 
                                                          
12
 I tested GDP per capita in the model of municipal corruption and found it to have an insignificant effect. This 
supports the hypothesis that in conditions of unequal distribution of wealth, poverty rates better capture the 
permissive effect that this vulnerability has to corruption. 
13
 Inequality is one other factor commonly used to explain corruption cross-nationally. However, the results are 
inconsistent, with inequality sometimes significant, and often not. In the context of this study, the causal 
mechanisms by which inequality on the municipal level would affect corruption are unclear. I tested inequality as a 
control variable in various model specifications for municipal corruption, but it never reached statistical 
significance. This result may be due to shortcomings in the data on inequality, which was only available for a single 
year, two years prior to the beginning of the period of analysis.   
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punish corruption. Education may also work to diminish corruption by diffusing more de-personalized, 
rule-based norms throughout the population.  This could change the values of a population, with more 
acts considered improper and corrupt, and thus avoided and punished. I hypothesize that this effect will 
hold on the municipal level: higher levels of education should lead to lower levels of municipal 
corruption.  
Another permissive factor of interest, urbanization, has been related to decreased corruption 
levels. The expectation is that corruption can thrive in rural areas, where people have little information 
and contact with other citizens, making it easy to hide corruption and increasing the opportunity. 
Previous case studies suggest that larger cities tend to have denser populations, more political 
information available and more extensive webs of communication among citizens, all of which act as 
deterrents to corruption. However, in the context of corruption in Brazilian municipalities, this 
conventional wisdom may not be true in all instances. It might be the case that more populous, 
urbanized municipalities provide more opportunities for corruption given the larger number of players 
involved and higher competition among them to win government contracts. Conversely, it may be that 
collusion amongst a small group of power players to make corruption “the only game in town” is easier 
amongst smaller populations. Or it may be easier to hide corruption in smaller municipalities since social 
networks are more spread out and information resources may be lower. Given these considerations, I 
include population as a control in my model, but I do not have a clear hypothesis about how it should 
affect municipal corruption.14    
The final permissive factor is the relative size of the public sector, which previous research holds 
may increase corruption through its effect on the opportunity structure.  According to public choice 
arguments, the larger the relative size of the public sector, the greater the likelihood of corruption 
                                                          
14
 I tested for a possible curvilinear effect (using a multiplicative term of the population) as well as a possible 
“diminishing returns” effect of population size (using the natural log of population). There was no statistical 
evidence for either of these types of effects. 
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because “the more contracts a government has to offer, the more incentives private sector actors have 
to bribe officials authorized to dispense contracts” (Montinola & Jackman 2002, 154). Large public 
sectors are believed to not only offer more opportunities for rent-seeking by political and economic 
actors, but also distort competition.15 However, the cross-national data on this issue does not offer 
unequivocal support for these arguments. In large sample statistical analyses carried out by Husted 
(1999, 350-351), Montinola and Jackman (2002, 166), and Treisman (2000, 436), size of government has 
no significant effect on corruption.   
In the context of Brazilian municipalities, too small of a public sector could be associated with 
more corruption. In small, poor municipalities, few resources in local government could lead to low 
institutional capacity. Low public sector wages and their result, lower levels of competency in personnel, 
may increase corruption because they cause difficulties for detection while making corruption payoffs 
more attractive. In addition, in underfunded municipalities, many of which lack basic computing 
equipment, adequate facilities, and sometimes even telephone service, combatting corruption may be a 
low-priority goal. Because there is a lack of consensus on the effect of public sector size, I have no clear 
hypothesis about its relationship with local corruption in my sample. 
 
Proximate factors 
Several proximate factors that may influence corruption levels sub-nationally through their 
effects on beliefs about detection and punishment are suggested by the findings of cross-national 
research, including the role of media and several political variables related to democracy.16 According to 
                                                          
15
 This argument is plausible, although as Montinola and Jackman point out using lobbying as an example, not all 
rent-seeking activities necessarily involve corruption (2002, 154). 
16
 Much of the cross-national research on corruption focuses on institutional configurations associated with 
corruption. For example, Westminster and party-centered parliamentary systems are hypothesized to be superior 
to both party- and candidate-centered presidential systems, which in turn are better than candidate-centered 
parliamentary systems for avoiding corruption (Rose-Ackerman 2001, 40). This is expected because the first two 
types of parliamentary systems provide more effective checks on individual politicians by their party, constituents 
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previous research, media can play a strong role in diminishing corruption, by providing oversight and 
acting as a whistleblower (Camaj 2013). Strong, independent media may help lower information costs to 
citizens gathering evidence about corruption. However, media may not always play such a positive role. 
In Latin America especially, there is anecdotal evidence of reporters who are threatened and intimidated 
out of reporting on corruption, as documented by groups such as Reporters Without Borders.17 Other 
stories of journalists who are paid by politicians to write corruption exposés about their political 
opponents have surfaced as well. 
A valid and specific concern about the importance of media in deterring corruption in the 
context of Brazilian municipalities is press independence. Though politicians in Brazil are banned from 
owning public media concessions by the 1988 Constitution, research in 2007 found that over 320 
communication channels had politicians as shareholders (Donos da Mídia, 2008). Several other channels 
are “owned” by frontmen and controlled by political interests. Especially in small towns in Brazil, it is 
often the case that whatever elite interests control politics also exercise de facto or de jure control of 
local media. Porto finds that “press in the less developed states is usually owned by local political 
oligarchs that tend to manipulate news coverage for political purposes” (2011, 107). Thus, the presence 
of local media outlets in Brazilian municipalities may not act to deter corruption through increasing the 
probability of actors being caught and punished for corrupt acts. Given these details, there is no clear 
hypothesis about the effect of media presence on local corruption in this sample.   
 The role of democracy in deterring or promoting corruption is one of the biggest controversies 
in cross-national research. Some argue that democracy decreases corruption. Sandholtz and Koetzle 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
and opposition. Gerring and Thacker find that presidential systems do tend to have higher corruption levels than 
parliamentary systems and that unitary governments have less corruption than federal systems (2004, 327). At the 
level of municipalities within a country, these institutional factors do not vary, so I cannot test their effects in my 
sample. 
17
 The phrase “plomo o plata” (literally “lead or silver” in Spanish, figuratively implying take our money or face 
violence) is applied to the situation that many reporters in Mexico must confront when reporting on corruption. 
See Committee to Protect Journalists (http://www.cpj.org/). 
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state that “the more extensive are democratic freedoms and the more effective are democratic 
institutions, the greater will be the deterrent to corruption” (2000, 38). This argument is based on the 
expectation that democratic governments are more open and therefore more transparent. In addition, 
elections are a necessary condition for democracy; when leaders must compete for re-election, the 
public is free to punish office-holders for corruption. Economists further claim that the coordination 
problem in bribe-collection is more difficult to solve among legislators in a democracy, also leading to 
less corruption (Bardhan 1997, 1330). However, in his quantitative analysis of cross-national data on 
over 60 countries, Treisman finds that the current level of democracy in a country does not strongly 
affect corruption (2000, 438-439). A simple transition from an authoritarian government to a democracy 
is not enough to reduce corruption. In fact, the democratization process may be a particularly turbulent 
time with respect to corruption, as norms and expectations are shifting (see Geddes & Ribeiro Neto 
1999). Weyland states that “by dispersing power and requiring the consent of several institutions in 
decision making, the return of democracy has extended the range of actors who can demand bribes” 
(1998, 108). In Latin America during the Third Wave of Democratization, this may have been particularly 
true.  
Part of the controversy about the relationship between democracy and corruption arises 
because democracy is not a single phenomenon, but involves many dimensions and qualities. The 
previous research on the cross-national effects of democracy described above suggests that two aspects 
of democracy that may particularly affect corruption are competition and fragmentation. Competitive 
elections, a prerequisite to democracy, may allow the participation of a wider group of people in 
government. If informed citizens can choose their leaders from amongst competing alternatives, there is 
a higher possibility that citizens will “throw the scoundrels out”, i.e. punish corrupt officials through 
sanctions, impeachment or withdrawing their votes. However, there may be a threshold effect of 
competition. Montinola and Jackman state that “corruption is typically a little higher in countries with 
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intermediate levels of political competition than in their less democratic counterparts, but once past the 
threshold, higher levels of competition are associated with considerably less corruption” (2002, 167). In 
her discussion of this issue, Rose-Ackerman theorizes that 
Democracies based on strong legal foundations provide a stable framework for economic 
activity. For this framework to operate efficiently, however, politicians must seek re-
election and must feel insecure about their prospect, but not too insecure. This leads to a 
‘paradox of stability’. Too much security of tenure can further corrupt arrangements. Too 
much insecurity can have the same effect (1999, 127). 
 
In the case of Brazilian municipalities, there is reason to believe that competition may have this type of 
complex relationship with corruption, perhaps captured by a curvilinear term. In systems like Brazil, 
where corruption is considered simply just another way of doing business, politicians may resort to 
corruption to preserve and/or increase their power in highly competitive and insecure situations and 
voters may be resigned to this fact. I argue that based on the preceding considerations, there is no clear 
hypothesis of the effect that competition will have on municipal corruption. 
While high levels of political competition in a municipality could be either positive or negative, 
the structure of that competition matters as well. It is well known that highly fragmented legislatures 
where there is difficulty in forming cohesive alliances tend to be weaker with respect to the executive. 
This means that they would be less able to apply sanctions to a corrupt executive. In systems that 
depend on checks and balances between branches of government, a fragmented legislature may be 
ineffective at providing oversight of other government functions and acting as a robust competition and 
electoral alternative. In these cases, fragmentation may lead to higher levels of corruption. The risk of 
high levels of fragmentation generating more corruption was dramatically highlighted in the Brazilian 
case of the mensalão scandal. Faced with the challenge of achieving ambitious legislation in a legislature 
composed of representatives from 20 different political parties, the president’s party made illegal 
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payment to legislators from various other parties to vote for government programs in order to 
overcome their own limited legislative weight of only about 18% of seats.18 
The combination of the effects of fragmentation and competition in the Brazilian system can be 
toxic. Brazil’s fragmentation problem is compounded by the weakness of its political parties, creating a 
system where “electoral volatility is comparatively high; more than one-third of sitting legislators change 
parties during a term; and individualism, clientelism, and personalism, rather than programmatic 
appeals, dominate electoral campaigns” (Samuels 2006, 1). Samuels argues that the legislative branch is 
so weak in Brazil that most politicians are more concerned with using their time in office to cultivate 
opportunities for career advancement into higher office or achieving some other personal advantage 
than they are in re-election (2003). If this is indeed the case, the assumption that politicians refrain from 
corrupt acts because they are worried about competition from cleaner challengers may not hold. 
Unfortunately for Brazil, with its open list electoral system and chaotic party system, legislative 
fragmentation and the resulting deadlock is all too common; corruption may frequently be utilized as a 
tactic for coping with this challenge.  
Most Brazilian municipalities mirror the national-level dynamic – a relatively strong executive 
and a weak, fragmented legislature – and thus may face the same pressures.  Several cases have been 
documented where mayors funneled municipal money to campaign funds for their own re-election, for 
example. In less competitive, fragmented municipalities, it may be easier to hide corruption since there 
is no strong, cohesive opposition that is able to expose the abuses of the group in power. Thus 
competition and fragmentation must be analyzed as permissive covariates of municipal corruption.   
Despite the weakness of political parties in Brazil, corruption may vary according to the specific 
party in power. Parties that come to power based on platforms of combatting corruption may find 
themselves committed to this principle once in office at the risk of losing future votes and support. Thus 
                                                          
18
 The term mensalão translates approximately to “big monthly allowance”. That is because legislators reportedly 
earned about $30,000 reais per month to vote with the government.  
 
 
25 
 
these parties, whether completely willing or not, may practice less corruption while in government since 
their electoral appeal is based particularly on this issue. In contrast to other Brazilian political parties, 
the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), or Worker’s Party, is the only party to have shown a dramatic 
increase in mass partisanship in the last 15 years (Samuels 2006). It is also considered the most 
organized, institutionalized and ideologically cohesive of the Brazilian political parties. Interestingly, the 
PT was founded with and continues to display a commitment to combatting corruption (Keck 1986). PT 
governments at the subnational level, for example in Porto Alegre from 1989 to 2005, were widely seen 
as examples of clean government. While this reputation has become somewhat tarnished, especially by 
the 2005 mensalão scandal under President Lula, municipal governments headed by the PT may still 
show reduced corruption levels relative to municipalities governed by other parties. The strength of the 
PT is not equally distributed throughout the country as shown in Figure 1.1, so this may also explain 
some of the sub-national variance in corruption levels. The question of the effect of PT governance on 
deterring corruption is valid and relevant to investigate; it is the final permissive factor analyzed here. 
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Figure 1.1: Percentages of PT mayors by state and region in the sample of municipalities
 
 
Measuring municipal corruption 
 The principal dependent variable of this study is municipal corruption, viewed in the Brazilian 
context. In order to help illustrate what this phenomenon looks like, I briefly describe some forms of 
municipal corruption observed.  Next, I discuss the problems of measuring corruption, beginning with a 
discussion of the principal ways that corruption has been measured in previous studies, then elaborating 
on the method that I chose.  Then I describe how the data was collected on the dependent variable.  
Finally, I briefly summarize the data on the independent variables utilized in the study, before moving on 
to discussing the results of the analysis. 
 I take the most commonly used definition of corruption as a starting point: the improper use of 
public office for private gain. Thus, municipal corruption would occur when any municipal official uses 
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their office to ensure private gain. These officials include figures as diverse as the mayor, city council 
representatives, workers in the municipal bureaus of health, transportation, education, etc. The gains in 
question include monetary bribes, political favors, jobs, preferential treatment, kickbacks and other 
benefits. These benefits are considered part of a corrupt act whether they go directly to the official or to 
his or her friends, family, political party, allies or cronies. As this study focuses on corruption within the 
municipal bureaucracy, it also does not take into account some forms of corruption. Bribes or illegal 
payments by corporations or non-governmental organizations to public officials would not be 
recognized as political corruption unless they involved these organizations with the prefeitura. In 
addition, bribe-taking by police within the boundaries of a municipality would not be included because 
the police are not directly controlled by the municipal government. Corruption within a large works 
project carried out by the federal government, though within the geographic confines of the 
municipality, would also not be captured since it doesn’t involve the agents of the municipal 
government. 
 What types of corruption occur in Brazilian municipalities and under what conditions? Some 
illuminating examples can be drawn from fieldwork that I completed accompanying government audits 
(which will be described more in depth below) for ten weeks in five different municipalities in 2009 and 
2010. In one municipality observed, the outgoing mayor’s faction had been in power for over twenty 
years; however, he lost his bid for re-election to the opposition group in the October elections. After the 
election results were known, the municipal secretary of health ordered about 1.6 million reais worth of 
medications for the municipal pharmacies, equivalent to a two years’ supply of these medications, some 
of which were not even needed at the time. The acquisition order attested that the medications were a 
one year supply; the pharmacist responsible for the order and signer of the document was a relative of 
the outgoing mayor. When the new party took power in January, there was no proof that the 
medications had ever been delivered, the medications were not in stock, and the paperwork required by 
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law as proof of the transactions had disappeared. The facts of the case established through the 
municipal audit show clear indications of fraud and possible embezzlement.  
 More generally, many forms of municipal corruption are relatively simple. For example, a 
company owned by the mayor’s daughter may have won a construction bid after all other competitors 
were eliminated due to minor technicalities. Or the wife of the municipal secretary of health may be 
receiving monthly conditional cash payments through the Bolsa Família program that her family does 
not actually qualify for. Other common types of corruption found are fraud in public works: projects that 
had been built meters smaller than the legal contract specified, with the excess materials presumably 
enriching someone else’s pockets. The forms of corruption vary widely, though some types are repeated 
in almost every municipality sampled. For example, in practically every municipality examined, health 
workers in the public system are routinely paid for various different posts where their work schedule as 
required by law would total over 100 hours. 
 The best publicized and most commonly used measures of corruption in academic literature are 
those based on aggregated perceptions indices created from survey data on citizen and/or expert 
attitudes.19 Examples of these indices include the World Bank’s Governance indicators, Transparency 
International’s Corruptions Perceptions Index, the Economist’s Business Risk Index and others. However, 
though these measures are widely used for cross-national research, they do not capture variations 
within a country. Alternative measures of corruption that offer more flexibility include indices based on 
corruption prosecutions and convictions, victimization reports and media stories on scandals. Yet these 
measures can be difficult to collect and hard to standardize across units of observation. A newer type of 
measure that is uniquely suited to analyzing corruption in subnational governments is performance-
based measures. These measures are desirable because they are generally based on uniform criteria, 
                                                          
19
 Determining the causes of corruption by using measurements of national corruption composed of aggregated 
perceptions data can risk ecological fallacy. This problem is discussed in-depth in Seligson 2002a. My measurement 
is of corruption on the municipal level and my explanatory variables are also municipal-level characteristics, 
avoiding this issue. 
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generated by disinterested, professional staff and directly record deviations from professional rules of 
conduct for public servants. These measures have also previously been utilized in the Brazilian context, 
so my study may build on the findings of these analyses by using a broadly comparable measure.   
In order to look at corruption on a sub-national level in Brazil, I use a measure of municipal 
corruption based on government performance, derived from audits conducted by the Controladoria-
Geral da União (CGU) or Office of the Comptroller General, an organ of the federal government.20 The 
audit program has as its stated goal improving the use of public funds passed from the federal 
government to the municipalities. The audit process operates quarterly, and it begins in Brasília with the 
random selection by lottery of 60 small and medium municipalities throughout Brazil.21 Audit teams of 
10 to 15 analysts and technicians are sent out from each state branch of the CGU to the municipalities, 
where they remain for 1-2 weeks, collecting information on the municipal government. Specifically, they 
“examine accounts and documents and make personal, physical inspections of public works and services 
in action, but above all they privilege contact with the public, directly or through community councils 
and other organized entities, as a way to stimulate citizens to participate in the control of the 
application of resources coming from the taxes that they are charged” (CGU 2012).22 Auditors evaluate 
documentation of transfers and use of the public funds, such as bank accounts, receipts, solicitations for 
public projects, bids, production accounts, stock reports, etc. They also monitor the outcomes of this 
spending in various ways, including visits to locations of public service provision, interviews with those 
                                                          
20
 The CGU, the executive anti-corruption agency in Brazil, is widely known for its institutional excellence. 
Employees are subjected to rigorous national testing to be hired and it is a career occupation with advancement 
within the organization. There is a strong culture of commitment to high quality job performance, with an 
emphasis on professional conduct, technical rigorousness and political neutrality. 
21
 These types of municipalities account for over 70% of the Brazilian population, so the coverage of the country is 
quite large. Excluded from the pool of municipalities in the lotteries are the 26 state capitals, the federal district 
(Brasília) and 17 of the most populous cities.  This amounts to no more than two or three municipalities per state 
that fall outside the universe of possible cases. 
22
 Author’s translation. See 
http://www.cgu.gov.br/AuditoriaeFiscalizacao/ExecucaoProgramasGoverno/Sorteios/leiamais.asp 
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who use public services, in loco confirmation of the existence and conditions of public patrimony, 
measurement and verification of building projects, etc.  Once the data collection stage is complete, the 
team returns to the capital, analyzes all of the accumulated information and prepares a report on the 
municipal government, which is eventually made available to the public online. 
Due to the wide scope and deep level of investigation of the audit program, the CGU reports are 
a valuable and unique resource to analyze the efficiency, effectiveness, probity and general 
performance of Brazilian municipalities. More relevant to this analysis, these audits reports can be used 
to create a high-quality proxy for the overall levels of corruption in Brazilian municipalities. This is 
because: CGU data is neutral (municipalities selected by lottery, conducted by technocratic analysts and 
municipal outsiders); collected uniformly (set procedures and questionnaires); and based on direct 
evidence of how the government functions through evaluating confidential files and other information 
(the access to documentation is much greater than for any other measure). However, there are some 
limits to this performance-based method of assessment. It may miss corruption at the municipal level 
that does not directly involve municipal agents, such as violations involving police or federal highway 
authorities. In addition, because of the difficulties of detecting quid pro quo exchanges and influence-
peddling, some of these acts may not be captured by the CGU audit process. Thus the CGU’s assessment 
of municipal government corruption produces a measure that is a proxy for overall corruption in a 
municipality, rather than a direct measure of all such corruption. Especially since the data will be used to 
compare across municipalities, I argue that this is a reasonable measure of municipal corruption despite 
these limitations.          
The CGU has carried out this municipal audit program continuously since 2003,23 covering a total 
of 1965 municipalities (as of June 2012) or 35.32% of Brazilian municipalities and over $18.4 billion reais 
                                                          
23
 My database only includes municipalities audited from 2006 to 2010.  In 2006, the methodology of the audits 
was altered to be more comprehensive, making earlier audit reports less consistent and informative in comparison 
to the newer data. I also chose to limit the time period due to the change in political leadership: President Lula’s 
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of federal resources (Leia mais, CGU 2012). While the audits only cover the use of federal funds, these 
represent the most important source of municipal revenues, making up 65% of municipal budgets on 
average (Brollo & Nannicini 2011, 14).24 My database comes from the reports on the 719 municipalities 
that were audited by CGU teams from 2006-2010. Since there were about 5,564 municipalities in Brazil 
according to the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE), this sample represents almost 13% 
of the universe of municipalities.25 Through careful coding of the violations cited in the audit reports, I 
constructed a database of municipal corruption and irregularities. As each report averaged roughly 100 
pages per municipality, over 7,000 pages of audit accounts were considered.26 The coding scheme that I 
used to classify errors was based on a method devised by Ferraz and Finan.27 They describe their coding 
rules as follows: 
For the purpose of coding irregularities, we deﬁne political corruption to be any irregularity 
associated with fraud in procurements, diversion of public funds, and over-invoicing. 
Speciﬁcally, we deﬁne a procurement to be irregular if: i) a required procurement was not 
executed; ii) the minimum number of bids was not attained; iii) there was evidence of fraud 
in the procurement process (e.g. use of bids from non-existing ﬁrms). We categorize 
diversion of public funds as any expenditure without proof of purchase or provision and/or 
direct evidence of diversion provided by the CGU. Finally, we deﬁne over-invoicing as any 
evidence that public goods and services were bought for a value above the market price 
(Ferraz & Finan 2007, 15). 
 
Using these rules as a basis for my coding of the irregularities indicated in the audit reports, I classified 
the errors into two main categories with subtypes as described in Table 1.1 below. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
second term lasted from 2006 to 2010. As part of the executive branch, the administrative body of the CGU 
changed little during this time period. 
24
 Further, Brollo and Nannicini find that “excluding some big cities, such as Brazilian state capitals, municipal 
governments are strongly dependent on these transfers for their budget, as tax revenues average to only 5.5% of 
municipal total revenues” (2011, 14). 
25
 Some municipalities were audited multiple times, so the actual coverage of municipalities is slightly less. 
26
 I double-checked my coding reliability and consistency by re-checking a random sample of 10% of the reports 
and found that the margin of error was small. I also compared my coding outcomes to those of Ferraz and Finan 
and found that they were highly consistent and compatible with their work. 
27
 Studies that use the Ferraz and Finan measure (or one closely related) include Ferraz & Finan 2007, 2008; 
Pereira, Melo & Figueiredo 2009; and Colaço Alves & Azevedo Sodré 2008. 
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Table 1.1: Classification of errors in audit reports 
Category 1: Serious Irregularities 
Indicative of Corruption 
Examples 
Type 1 Errors in bidding process bids received from "façade companies", participation of 
firms owned by members of the political administration 
in bidding, unjust disqualification of companies from 
bidding process, no competitive bidding process carried 
out 
Type 2 Errors in execution forged receipts documenting purchases, purchased 
goods inexistent, works executed using less-expensive 
goods than supposedly purchased, unexecuted works 
reported complete, receipt of social services by 
municipal employees who fail to qualify for programs 
Type 3 Errors in contracting contract to purchase goods or services for above the 
market price 
Category 2: Administrative Irregularities Examples 
Type 4  All other irregularities 
including those due to 
incompetence, lack of 
resources, or unclear reasons 
selection of municipal employees without proper 
competition process, incorrect names or birthdates on 
official social security roles, receipt of Bolsa Família by 
families apparently above income conditionality for 
program, lack of planned menus for school lunches 
All irregularities were further classified by area, that is, the Federal Ministry that disbursed the 
funds for the program, such as Health, Education, Public Works, Agrarian Development, Justice, etc. The 
number of programs evaluated in each area and the amount of money involved in the programs 
evaluated were also included in the database so that they could be used as controls for the frequency 
rate and relative size of irregularities detected.28 Figure 1.2 shows the distribution of the types of errors 
reported in the CGU audit summaries. The great majority of errors reported were coded as not 
indicative of corruption (Type 4). These errors could not be absolutely considered to indicate corrupt 
acts, either because they were mere minor administrative errors or due to a lack of enough information 
to determine the probable cause of the error. The coding choices were made as conservatively as 
possible, with an effort to only code items as serious violations in cases with strong evidence, in order to 
                                                          
28
 Further research plans include looking at which part of the program process generates more errors and why and 
which policy areas had more or less corruption and irregularities, but that is outside the scope of this particular 
article. 
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avoid “false positives” on Types 1, 2 and 3. Thus, only about 16% of the total irregularities cited were 
considered to present serious indications of corruption and as such to be included in my proxy measure 
of corruption. 
Figure 1.2: Distribution of types of irregularities in the database 
 
 The main dependent variable, the rate of serious irregularities indicative of corruption (Types 1, 
2 and 3) per service order (number of programs evaluated) per municipality, ranges from a minimum of 
0 to a maximum of 1.72 errors per service order, with a mean of 0.36, a median of 0.29 and a standard 
deviation of 0.28. Figure 1.3 summarizes the averages of this dependent variable by state. As expected, 
the cleanest states are generally those of the South and Southeast, which are relatively developed areas 
of the country where we would expect corruption to be least likely.  The states with the highest levels of 
irregularities are mostly those from the Northeast of the country, a region that is not only poorer and 
less educated but also less equal.  As the figure shows, the rate of serious irregularities often goes hand-
8% 
7% 
1% 
84% 
Type 1: corruption in bidding
Type 2: corruption in execution
Type 3: corruption in contracting
Type 4: other irregularities
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in-hand with the rate of all irregularities, but the correlation is not perfect. In order to determine 
whether or not errors of Types 1, 2 and 3 were in fact capturing a different underlying phenomenon (i.e. 
corruption) than Type 4 errors, I performed a factor analysis on the four types of error rates. The results 
confirmed the decision to use rate of serious irregularities as the dependent variable, by yielding two 
factors, one including Types 1, 2 and 3, and the second factor including only Type 4 errors. 29 This 
outcome further validates my choice of measurement for the dependent variable.30
                                                          
29
 Using principal component factor (pcf) analysis, the eigenvalues were as follows: Type 1 = 1.79, Type 2 = 0.93, 
Type 3 = 0.72 and Type 4 =0.5.  
30
 I tested alternative measures of the dependent variable, including total value of errors (rate of monetary 
expenditures of programs in which errors were detected), rate of all irregularities (including Types 1, 2, 3 and 4) 
and total value of irregularities (rate of monetary expenditures of programs in which any irregularities were 
detected). None of these dependent variables were as precise as the dependent variable that I chose to measure 
corruption, rate of serious errors per service order. 
35 
 
Figure 1.3: Rate of serious errors and irregularities by state 
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Independent variables 
The main independent variables evaluated with respect to the dependent variable municipal 
corruption (captured by the rate of serious errors detected per service order) are population, poverty 
rate, education levels, municipal government spending per capita, media presence, competition in the 
mayoral race (electoral dominance), legislative fragmentation, PT mayor and a dummy for the 2008 
election year.31 For the permissive variables, poverty was measured as the percentage of the municipal 
population below the poverty line in 2003 according to official statistics of the IBGE. Education was 
captured using the average years of schooling in the municipality in the year 2000 according to the 
official census figures. Population figures are also from the IBGE, comprising the estimated municipal 
population in thousands, lagged one year in relation to the audit year. Municipal government size, 
drawn from the IBGE @cidades database, is total expenditure per capita by the prefeitura in thousands 
for the year previous to the audit.    
As for the proximate variables, media presence is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one 
if there was a local AM radio station in the municipality as of 2006, according to the IBGE Pesquisa de 
Informações Básicas Municipais. This measure was selected because previous studies on Brazil 
emphasized the role of local media, especially AM radio, in disseminating information about municipal 
government abuses and thus, lowering corruption (Ferraz & Finan 2007; 2008). Electoral dominance, a 
measure of competitiveness, is the vote share of the current mayor (in office during the year of the 
audit) in the first round of the elections that brought him or her to power, according to official results 
from the Tribunal Superior de Eleições (TSE). Fragmentation is the effective number of parties in the 
town council (Câmara Municipal), calculated using the method devised by Laasko and Taagepera (1979). 
                                                          
31
 Other variables and alternate measures tested include: economic development (municipal GDP per capita), 
inequality (municipal Gini coefficient), literacy (rate of adult literacy), PT legislative weight (percentage of seats on 
the town council held by PT), lottery edition (iteration of the CGU lottery in which the audit was performed), an 
interaction effect between development and inequality, curvilinear effect of competition, Human development 
index (HDI of municipality), and others. None of these were found to have significant effects on the dependent 
variable. 
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This measure captures fragmentation in the legislative branch and thus its ability to check the abuses of 
the executive branch, the prefeitura. PT mayor is a dummy variable that gets assigned a value of one if 
the mayor in the audit year was from the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT).32 The final variable was a 
dummy assigned to audits conducted in an election year, 2008. This control was necessary because the 
dynamics of election year politics could affect how much corruption the CGU detects, either because the 
competition pressures of elections could lead to more corruption to fuel the campaign machine, or less 
corruption as dirty mayors try to hide their misdeeds in order to preserve their electoral bids from 
damage. Table 1.2 below describes these variables further by summarizing their means at varying levels 
of corruption rates: low (0-0.43), medium (0.43-0.86), high (0.86-1.25) and very high (1.25-1.73).  
Table 1.2: Means of independent variables by corruption rate 
  
  
Low 
corruption 
Medium 
corruption 
High 
corruption 
Very high 
corruption 
Population 27401.12 27240.58 40496.49 26779.00 
Poverty 39.89 50.92 52.80 54.01 
Education 4.52 3.66 3.23 3.13 
Size of municipal government 1283.36 1041.57 769.16 695.50 
Media presence 0.24 0.18 0.23 0.25 
Electoral dominance 53.17 51.53 50.22 52.23 
Fragmentation 0.10 0.06 0.05 0 
PT mayor 4.56 4.66 5.10 5.87 
Election year 0.15 0.19 0.26 0.75 
 
Analysis and results 
 To test the effects of my independent variables, I completed a cross-sectional regression 
analysis of municipal corruption using serious violations per service order as my dependent variable.  
The dependent variable was weighted to compensate for the fact that municipalities, while randomly 
                                                          
32
 Including a variable capturing municipal governments run by mayors from other parties would not be expected 
to demonstrate any impact on corruption levels, since the parties rarely take a stand on the issue of corruption. In 
fact, many of these parties are more personalistic and clientelistic vehicles with heterogeneous policy preferences 
and radically varying coalitions at various levels of government. See Samuels 2006 for a further discussion of 
Brazilian parties and PT exceptionalism.   
 
 
38 
 
chosen, did not have the same probability of selection.  This is due to the design of the lottery, which 
selects a certain number of municipalities per state to audit in a quantity out-of-proportion to the total 
number of municipalities contained within the state. Thus, the correction ensures that states that over-
sample their municipalities do not drive the results and states that under-sample will not have more 
negligible explanatory weight. The results of my analysis are summarized in Table 1.3.33  
                                                          
33
 I also looked for possible multicollinearity through examining the correlation coefficients of all of the 
independent variables. Most of the correlations between the variables were quite low, indicating that there was 
little danger of violating the regression assumption of noncollinearity. There was one correlation of 0.6, which 
might be considered problematic, between the poverty and education measures. To deal with this possibility, I 
computed the model with each of these variables separately and compared the results to Model 1, which includes 
both. I found that in each case the estimated coefficients of the variables in the model remained almost the same 
and with the same levels of significance, though the indicator of model fit decreased when either of the variables 
was dropped from the model. Thus, the effect of poverty did not appear to compensate for the effect of education 
and vice versa. From this testing, it appears that multicollinearity is not a serious concern here. 
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Table 1.3: Regression results for municipal corruption rate (serious violations per service order) 
Independent variables 
 
Model 1 
  
Expected sign 
of coefficient 
Predicted 
coefficients 
Population ? -0.01* 
municipal population in tens of thousands, lagged 1 year   (0.00) 
Poverty + 0.22** 
proportion of municipal residents living in poverty in 2003   (0.07) 
Education - -0.09*** 
average years of school attended for population in 2000   (0.01) 
Size of municipal government ? -0.02† 
municipal government spending per capita in thousands, 
lagged 1 year 
 
(0.01) 
Media presence ? 0.06** 
dummy variable for local AM radio station in 2006    (0.02) 
Electoral dominance ? -0.16* 
proportion of votes won by current mayor in first election 
round   
(0.07) 
Fragmentation + 0.01* 
effective number of parties on the town council   (0.01) 
PT mayor - -0.04† 
dummy variable for a PT mayor in office   (0.02) 
Election year ? 0.10*** 
dummy variable for audits that took place in 2008   (0.03) 
Constant 
 
0.62*** 
    (0.08) 
R2   0.26 
N=719; Standard errors in parentheses; data has been weighted by number of municipalities 
selected versus total number of municipalities per state to deal with the unbalanced 
sample. Analyses performed using StataSE 12. 
p<0.001***; p<0.01**; p<0.05*; p<0.1† 
 According to this model, the permissive variables that had significant effects on the corruption 
variable were economic development, education, population and size of the municipal government. 
Economic development acted as expected: increased development (understood as a decline in poverty 
levels) is associated with lower corruption levels. Higher education levels also decreased corruption, a 
result that is congruent with other research studies. Population of the municipality did have a significant 
effect on the level of the dependent variable. There is evidence for the expectation that more populous 
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municipalities have lower levels of corruption, perhaps due to increased networks of information. Size of 
municipal government was found to have a weakly significant negative effect on corruption. This 
supports the argument that there is space for local governments to play a healthy role in their 
municipalities without necessarily increasing corruption. 
 With respect to the proximate factors hypothesized to affect corruption levels, media presence, 
electoral dominance, fragmentation and PT mayor all had significant effects on the dependent variable. 
There was no evidence for the expectation that media presence acts as a check on corruption; on the 
contrary, the positive coefficient supports the contention that significant media capture is occurring in 
these cases.34 In the case of electoral dominance, there was a significant negative effect of vote share on 
corruption. That is, increasing competition was linked to increasing corruption, substantiating the claim 
that corruption can be a tactic to cope with high competition in these municipalities (rather than an 
effective check on government corruption by competitive opposition parties).35 Fragmentation had a 
significant positive effect on corruption; more fragmented legislatures were associated with more 
system corruption. The outcome for PT mayors was in the predicted direction, though weakly and 
significant; the PT’s reputation for clean governance at the municipal level still finds some support 
within this sample.36 Finally, the election year dummy variable also reaches significance in a positive 
direction. This indicates that in an election year, there tend to be more corrupt violations. This could be 
                                                          
34
 Alternative explanations of this result may be that there is a lack of programs dealing with local politics or that 
there are few listeners to these stations and programs. 
35
 I also ran the model with two other specifications of competitiveness in order to test Rose-Ackerman’s argument 
that both high competition and low competition can generate corruption. I tested for a curvilinear effect of 
competition and tested for a “threshold effect”, through a categorical measure of high, medium and low 
competition. The results for both of these specifications showed insignificant effects of competitiveness on 
corruption. 
36
 I also tested for PT influence in government by running the model with a variable capturing the percentage of PT 
politicians on the town council. This variable did not reach significance, though it was in the expected direction, i.e. 
more PT presence associated with reduced corruption. 
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because corruption is a tactic used to win elections, perhaps by funneling public resources to buy 
support, and thus will be higher during political campaigns. 
 
 Conclusion 
The goal of this analysis was to begin to explain variation in corruption patterns at the 
subnational level. It analyzed corruption at the level of municipalities, using an innovative proxy variable 
based on actual government performance. Informed by previous research on the correlates of 
corruption in large, cross-national studies, I generated a series of hypotheses about which variables 
could explain varying levels of corruption within a single institutional environment.  I investigated the 
case of Brazil, which offers both a rich source of data on municipal government performance and a 
highly relevant and important case for corruption research. The results that supported previous research 
were that both increased level of development and increased education levels were correlated with 
lower corruption in municipalities. The effects of population size, electoral dominance, media presence 
and municipal government size were also significant, though in ways not hypothesized by most cross-
national studies. These divergent effects may be due to the particular characteristics of municipal 
governments versus national governments that impact the causal processes of corruption or they may 
be due to factors specific to the Brazilian context. More study is necessary to determine to what extent 
these findings characterize other political entities. Below, I elaborate more on some further implications 
of my research. 
Local political conditions are one set of explanatory factors that are often overlooked when the 
analysis of corruption focuses on the national and international levels.  According to this analysis, these 
are very significant elements in explaining variation in levels of corruption within a country. When 
analyzed in conjunction with other, more stable factors such as population, education levels and socio-
economic development, these political and social variables provide a much fuller picture of corruption 
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dynamics. While cross-national research indicates several variables that could affect subnational 
patterns of corruption, these factors can only suggest that we should expect higher corruption in small, 
poor municipalities with relatively low levels of education. By adding the dimension of local political 
variables, we can understand more about why even in those regions prone to corruption, some cities 
remain cleaner than others. There is some evidence that having a pro-transparency party in power, a 
strong, cohesive opposition, and some healthy level of political competition – all improve the likelihood 
that corruption will be lower in a municipality. 
Political competition, measured by electoral dominance, plays a more complex role than 
expected, perhaps because higher competition incentivizes politicians to consolidate or buy support in 
an uncertain climate through corrupt means. This may be especially true in fragmented legislatures and 
party systems, as seen in this case. These findings point to some possible reasons why the effect of 
democracy on corruption levels varies widely. Further research may explore under what contexts 
democratic competition is effective in deterring corruption. One initial hypothesis is that while voters 
may prefer to throw out corrupt politicians and elect clean politicians, in systems where corruption is 
pervasive, voters view all candidates as corrupt and base their vote choice on other issues. 
Fragmentation should also be explored further to examine its primary mechanisms of acting on 
corruption. One possibility is that it inhibits the formation of a cohesive opposition and decreases the 
ability of the legislature to provide oversight. Another possibility is that fragmentation may lead to 
deadlocked legislatures incapable of forming majorities to pass legislation. In this situation, corruption, 
probably along with patronage, pork-barreling and logrolling, is used to solve the coordination problem. 
In the municipalities studied here, several variables impact corruption in ways that conventional 
wisdom might find counter-intuitive. Media presence appears not to be an active check against 
corruption, which may mean that media independence is a necessary condition for the media to 
decrease corruption. In many towns in Brazil, the key political figures are also the owners of the media 
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or allied to these owners by class, family or professional ties, making them less likely to criticize local 
government. Local media may also not have a strong enough power base to confront the political power 
players on their abuses, even if it were disposed to do so. It would be interesting in further research to 
see if media does have an effect in larger cities, where a more independent, resource-rich, plural 
perspective may be present.  
Another interesting finding that deserves further research is the effect of public sector size on 
corruption levels. Contrary to the expectations of neoliberal economics, a larger public sector appears to 
be not entirely undesirable, at least on the local level. In addition, it seems that decentralization of 
competencies should be accompanied by fiscal decentralization. At least in the municipalities studied, 
higher municipal spending was not related to higher corruption. This may be because higher per capita 
spending by the municipal government could actually be used to provide higher wages, attract more 
capable public servants and provide city governments with better facilities and tools to do their jobs 
cleanly and transparently. Based on field research that I carried out in Brazil, this explanation has face-
value validity: the poorest municipal governments that I observed were understaffed, badly paid, under-
educated and over-worked. All of these characteristics could make corruption both more attractive to 
government functionaries as well as easier to get away with. This may be especially true in the context 
of a mayor who lacks the political motivation or interest to combat corruption. Cross-national research 
may support the findings on public sector size, especially with respect to the positive effect of higher 
public sector wages (La Porta et al. 1999; Montinola & Jackman 2002, 169). Future research on local 
government could explore under what conditions money is well spent and under what conditions it is 
diverted into corruption. It may also illuminate whether there is a threshold effect to per capita 
municipal spending, beyond which basic necessities are provided for and incentives to indulge in 
corruption begin to rise. 
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The most intriguing findings of this study, about the importance of political fragmentation, 
electoral dominance, the size of public sector and party in power, suggest interesting possibilities for 
research on corruption at the state and national level in Brazil. Many of these factors may also be at 
work in other levels of government, which share some similar dynamics and problems of governance. As 
Macaulay points out, “the problems of coalitional presidentialism visible on the national stage as the 
mensalão scandal of 2005 are also present as “coalitional gubernatorialism and mayorism” in state and 
municipal governments” (2011, 222). Legislative fragmentation and competition may be particularly 
relevant to explaining corruption in government, since mayors, governors and presidents are subject to 
the same challenges. Other political figures may also make calculations based on these pressures that 
lead them to opt for more corrupt acts. The need to win elections in a fractionalized electorate and to 
build coalitions in order to pass legislation in a fragmented legislature may incentivize corruption 
throughout the Brazilian political system, though only future research can illuminate that issue.     
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CHAPTER 2: DETERMINANTS OF CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS IN BRAZILIAN MUNICIPALITIES 
Introduction 
Beginning in June of 2013, massive protests erupted in Brazil, the like of which have not been 
seen since the 1992 marches against then-President Collor de Melo. Like the earlier marches, which 
eventually ended with the impeachment and exit from office of the president, these demonstrations 
also have as one of their key rallying points popular disgust with corruption in government (Romero 
2013). According to a public opinion poll taken in July 2013, citizens believe that the single most 
important demand of the protesters is the end of corruption, with over 40% of respondents naming this 
as the primary goal (MDA Pesquisa 2013, 27). The on-going mobilization of millions of Brazilians on this 
issue is a significant sign of both the high levels of perceived corruption and the considerable weight 
citizens assign to the problem. 
In this article, I explore the determinants of corruption perception in Brazil using quantitative 
and qualitative data from four municipalities. Through surveys and audit reports, as well as information 
drawn from extensive fieldwork in these towns, I analyze the relationships between three different ways 
of measuring corruption: experience, perception and performance. The primary quantitative data comes 
from 120 interviews that I completed; the responses are collected in the Biddle Southeast Brazil 
Corruption database. In a multi-level model, I find that age, trust in societal organizations, support for 
the incumbent government, political information and assessment of government performance are the 
most important variables conditioning individual-level measures of corruption based on perceptions. 
More specifically, younger, more informed, those less trusting of societal organizations, more 
dissatisfied with municipal performance and opposition voters are more likely to perceive higher 
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municipal corruption. At the same time, contrary to what some analysts have argued, I find that 
personal experience with corruption plays an insignificant role in determining perceptions among the 
population of my sample. However, this analysis does show that citizens’ perceptions of corruption are 
positively correlated with performance-based measures of corruption in municipal government 
operations. The results add to previous research on the advantages and disadvantages of different 
corruption measures, as well as the determinants of corruption perceptions.  
 The first contribution of this article is its focus on corruption at the subnational level, through a 
database I created. While many studies examine corruption cross-nationally, focusing on variation 
within a single country can provide complementary data on the mechanisms at work and the direction 
of causation. Looking at variations of municipal corruption and their role in determining citizens’ 
attitudes is one way of limiting the analysis to a specific institutional context in order to draw 
implications that may illuminate the dynamics at work at the nation-state level. Municipalities are 
similar to national structures, in that they have an executive, a legislative branch, a bureaucracy, 
elections and citizen-voters. Thus if hypotheses find support at the local level, they may provide 
inferences for the dynamics operating at higher levels of government. Municipal-level corruption is also 
important to study in itself because it is the closest to the everyday experience of most of the Brazilian 
population.37 Municipal governments administer services such as trash collection, public education, 
basic healthcare, road maintenance and social assistance that reach the majority of the population. 
Corruption in these areas thus may be particularly salient for citizens and damaging to their confidence 
in government. Because corruption perceptions erode legitimacy and participation, it is necessary to 
analyze who is most affected, where and why. Through combining data on corruption at the level of the 
municipality and at the level of the individual, the context that conditions these relationships can be 
more fully understood.   
                                                          
37
 In a study of about 38,000 respondents in 24 Latin American countries, Bohn finds that the most common 
location of respondents’ experiences with corruption was in the municipal government (2012, 74). 
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 Another contribution of this article is in exploring the relationships among several different 
corruption measures: individual perceptions, victimization and underlying levels of corruption as 
assessed through auditing local government performance. These three types of measures represent the 
major methods of capturing corruption in previous research, though there has been less research on 
how they relate.38 Typically all three measures are not available for the same population, so there is 
little known about how well they correlate and how each affects the others. Since they are a relatively 
new method in the literature, especially little is known on how well performance-based metrics relate to 
the more conventional measures. Thus, this article adds to a growing research agenda that does not 
employ only a single measure to operationalize the challenging concept of corruption, but rather helps 
to understand how multiple measures can complement each other.  
 Studying subnational corruption in the Brazilian context is not just particularly timely given 
events in Brazil; it also has characteristics that make it highly relevant to a variety of other cases. Brazil is 
a large, diverse country with a high degree of decentralization. It combines a developing economy with a 
democracy that is still in the process of consolidation. The country’s institutional configuration, which 
combines a presidential structure with federalism, open-list proportional representation and a 
fragmented multi-party system combines several political-institutional elements that scholars generally 
identify as being most associated with corruption (Rose-Ackerman 2001; Gerring & Thacker 2004; Chang 
2005). The media in Brazil has been particularly aggressive in publishing and investigating news of 
scandals, though few guilty parties ever face serious sanctions for wrong-doing. The belief that the rich, 
powerful and well-connected operate with impunity is common, often expressed in the supposed words 
of former President Getúlio Vargas, “for my friends, anything – for my enemies, the law”. In addition, 
average Brazilians acknowledge the importance and ubiquitousness of the “jeitinho”, a difficult to define 
                                                          
38
 For exceptions, see Tverdova 2011 and Seligson 2006. 
 
 
52 
 
phrase that generally means getting around complicated rules or other obstacles through not altogether 
licit methods – including some that can be classified as corruption.     
   The paper begins with a brief discussion of ways of conceptualizing and measuring corruption.  It 
then describes several main ways of measuring corruption and their strengths and weaknesses. I next 
explore the factors that may affect corruption perceptions, including corruption victimization and 
corruption performance. Several hypotheses are developed about these relationships based on a 
summary of previous research. I then move on to explain my case selection and how the data was 
collected. This data is then utilized in a multi-level model of individual corruption perceptions with both 
respondent characteristics and municipal government corruption performance data. Next I discuss the 
model findings, particularly how the three corruption measures relate, and what impact attitudinal and 
political characteristics have on perceptions. In the conclusion, I point out other areas where these 
findings might apply and possible directions for further research. 
 
Defining and measuring corruption 
A complete list of what acts are called corruption would be practically impossible to compile. A 
few major examples include illegal surveillance, sale of public office, extortion, graft, perversion of 
justice, misappropriation, forgery, embezzlement, intimidation, undeserved pardons, blackmail, 
cronyism, accepting or coercing kickbacks, influence-peddling, perjury, and cover-ups (Caiden 2001, 17). 
Providing a definition that captures the key elements of the concept and that includes so many different 
manifestations is challenging. The clandestine nature of corruption adds even more to the difficulty of 
definition, as most of what goes on is concealed behind layers of schemes to protect the perpetrators 
from detection. Nonetheless, a tenuous consensus has developed in academic research that defines 
political corruption as “the improper use of public office for private gain”.  
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This definition limits corruption to acts in the public sector; transactions that do not involve 
government agents or funds cannot be considered instances of this type. Thus, what some might call 
corporate corruption or corruption within non-governmental organizations would not be captured by 
this definition when no governmental official is involved. In addition, the actions must be improper, 
which means that they must be condemned either by formal rules, widely held norms or professional 
standards of conduct. Thus, corruption depends partially on context and beliefs about what is proper, 
but also on rules that govern what is and is not permitted to government agents. However, popular 
attitudes and media reports often conflate various actions not covered by a strictly academic definition 
under the heading of corruption. Fraud in business, clientelism, patronage and even incompetent or 
poor governance may be considered corruption by citizens who are critical of the system. Both popular 
perceptions and personal experiences with corruption have been found to decrease regime legitimacy 
and political participation in Latin American publics (Seligson 2002; Davis, Camp & Coleman 2004). 
Investigating the links between these elements is important to understanding how corruption shapes 
behavior. 
Measurement of a political variable is itself a political issue.  With a phenomenon as elusive and 
complex as corruption, decisions about measurement can change not only the causal stories that 
academics tell, but also where businesspeople invest their money, which programs governments decide 
to implement, what laws are promulgated, who goes to jail and many other vital decisions. More 
specifically, in academic studies, how one measures corruption helps to determine the relationships that 
one sees with other variables of interest. In most studies of corruption, corruption’s links to either 
economic outcomes such as growth, FDI and inequality, or political outcomes such as regime support, 
participation, quality of democracy and legitimacy have been studied. However, these relationships may 
be subject to variance depending on how corruption is measured. Below I describe some common 
methods used to measure corruption and their strengths and weaknesses.  
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Perceptions measures 
The most widely used way to measure corruption is through metrics based on corruption 
perceptions: asking respondents how much corruption they see. Some studies rely on businesspeople or 
experts in a given polity, others ask any citizens. These measures are helpful because they take 
definitional variation among cultural contexts into account, which is necessary for understanding when 
behavior is improper. They are also fairly comprehensive since they tend to incorporate all types of 
corruption in a system.39  However, depending on the research question, this may paint corruption with 
too broad a brush, since there is no regard for distinctions between sectors (e.g. business vs. 
government), functions (e.g. police vs. bureaucracy), institutions (e.g. executive vs. legislature) or types 
(e.g. embezzlement of state funds vs. giving an unqualified relative a job in municipal government). 
These measures further imply that units with similar overall levels of corruption are somehow analogous 
in kind. For example, Slovakia and Cape Verde both scored a 4.9 of 10 on the 2007 Corruption 
Perceptions Index (CPI); however, this comparison illustrates nothing about the radically different 
patterns of corruption in these two countries (TI 2007). At worst, as Johnston states, these measures can 
create a “one size fits all” view of corruption and of reform as the process of making developing 
societies more like the West (2005, 1).40  
The best-publicized corruption measure, celebrated in annual press releases and appearing in 
worldwide media, is Transparency International’s Corruptions Perception Index (CPI).  The CPI has the 
widest coverage of countries over time of all of the publicly available data sets on corruption in the 
public sector. Transparency International (TI) defines corruption as “the abuse of public office for private 
                                                          
39
 One could possibly make the argument that corruption is rarely confined to a single state sector and instead is a 
pervasive characteristic. In these cases, such as some Latin American and Caribbean countries, general corruption 
perceptions may serve as an indicator of the level of a specific type of (otherwise unmeasured) corruption that is 
of interest. 
40
 To avoid over-generalization and preserve more fine-grained significance in classification, Johnston prefers to 
identify patterns of corruption, including those found in advanced societies, and rejects single aggregate measures 
altogether (2005, 195-219). 
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gain”, which is quite similar to the common academic definition (2005). There are no distinctions made 
between administrative and political corruption, petty and grand corruption. It simply measures the 
“degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials and politicians” (TI 2005). The 
information is from surveys of businesspeople and assessments by country analysts from around the 
world, including some who are locals in the countries evaluated; final scores thus reflect the perceptions 
of thousands of knowledgeable individuals. The CPI is a survey of surveys – it gives a single number that 
represents the aggregated results from several different surveys of thousands of respondents’ views on 
how much corruption is present in a given country.   
While the work of TI has been commendable and has certainly raised awareness about 
corruption, even its own experts readily acknowledge the CPI’s shortcomings. In general, there are 
problems with using aggregated perceptions of corruption and careless research may commit the error 
of ecological fallacy (Seligson 2002a, 273). Further, it is a relatively blunt measure, even looking cross-
nationally. However, perceptions seem to matter in determining both other attitudes that citizens hold 
about their governments and political behaviors. For example, studies have shown a negative effect of 
aggregate corruption perceptions on several factors responsible for preserving and deepening 
democracy, including legitimacy, system support and confidence in government (Morris 1991; Della 
Porta 2000; Davis, Camp & Coleman 2004, etc.). For Latin American and Caribbean publics, Bohn finds 
that corruption perceptions matter more than experience with corruption in determining satisfaction 
with democracy (2012, 90). The mechanisms and direction of causation are unclear in these 
relationships; trust could be the driver of both corruption perception and regime legitimacy ratings, or 
low legitimacy could make for high corruption perceptions.  Thus, research on the micro-foundations of 
these effects is necessary. 
In the case of economic studies, while several show that corruption perceptions impact 
economic outcomes, including growth, investment and inequality (Mauro 1997; Gupta, Davoodi & 
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Alonso-Terme 1998; Ades & Di Tella 1996, etc.), similar concerns are justified.  There may be problems 
of endogeneity or feedback effects among these variables. For example, if country X is ranked as 
extremely corrupt, this could lower investment from abroad and in fact lead to slower growth – a 
different direction of causation altogether (Mauro 1995). Further, the CPI and similar indices include the 
opinions of businesspeople who are the investors in many of these countries. If they believe that a 
country is highly corrupt, they will rate the country as highly corrupt on the CPI and they will also be less 
likely to invest in it – leading again to slower growth.  Thus, we can see that how corruption is measured 
matters, with perceptions especially vulnerable to reputation effects and feedback loops.   
 While perception measures may be particularly useful in explaining the links between 
corruption and regime support and legitimacy, perception by itself may be a misleading measure. It can 
be highly correlated with citizen satisfaction with their situation (pocketbook evaluations). Membership 
in or opposition to the faction in power also tends to affect whether citizens see the government as 
corrupt (Davis, Camp & Coleman 2004). Perceptions also vary across types of citizens (social class, 
neighborhood, etc.); different populations may have widely varying definitions of what and where 
corruption is. Thus, to gain a wider picture of corruption perceptions, the factors that shape these 
attitudes need to be taken into account.   
 
Victimization measures 
A second type of corruption measure based on citizens’ experiences is called “victimization”. 
These measures ask survey respondents to identify whether or not they have been the victims of certain 
types of corruption, such as bribes extorted by public officials or payment in exchange for their votes.41 
Victimization data avoids some of the disadvantages of perceptions measures, since it can be fairly 
specific about types and locations of corruption experienced and thus more comparable across contexts. 
                                                          
41
 Cross-national studies with questions about victimization include the UN’s International Crime Victim Survey, the 
Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) and Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer.    
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This measure is also less subjective, at least in theory, than perceptions measures. These characteristics 
suggest that victimization measures may be useful in examining specific types of corruption taking place 
across many different countries. They can also help identify those agencies that appear to operate under 
a norm of corrupt practices and which types of corruption average citizens have to deal with most 
frequently. 
Victimization data does have some disadvantages. The first problem is fear; as in any study of 
criminal acts, you may have respondents that do not answer truthfully for fear of retribution or 
judgment. Unlike perceptions of corruption, which are slightly removed from reflection on the self, 
respondents may feel that positive responses on victimization items implicate themselves. According to 
a meta-analysis of 35 years of studies, Lensveldt-Mulders et al. (2005) find that when asked about 
sensitive topics, such as criminal activities, respondents give incorrect answers 49% of the time on 
average. Also, victimization measures do not capture many types of corruption that are not directly 
observed by citizens, especially those at higher levels of government. They also cannot capture 
corruption that does not have direct “victims” or witnesses, for example, embezzlement  or 
undocumented campaign funds (caixa dois in Brazil). 
Subjectivity also plays a role; citizens may not always be aware of when they have been 
victimized and respondents may not feel that they have been victimized. For example, the clearest case 
that we would expect this type of measure to capture is that of a citizen who is asked by a state agent to 
pay a bribe in order to receive some good or service. However, if the citizen offers that bribe without 
being asked, he or she may not respond to a survey item asking about victimization since, after all, she 
offered the bribe. Both cases are still corruption; only one would “show up” in the victimization 
measure. In other cases, citizens do not realize that they have been subject to corruption; for example, 
studies in Mexico have found that payment of “la mordida,” a payment made to police to avoid a 
complex legal proceed, fine or loss of driving privileges, is not always understood by respondents as 
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corruption.42 Quid pro quo exchanges, gifts in kind of goods and services, vote-selling and granting 
sexual favors are all typical practices that can occur without the “victim” necessarily recognizing it as 
corruption.43 This is especially true when populations are uneducated and isolated.   
There is also a statistical issue that commonly arises with victimization data: excess zeros in the 
data distribution. Since a relatively small percentage of survey respondents typically claim to be victims 
of corruption, it may be difficult to gain samples large enough to learn much about the conditions under 
which victimization occurs.44 In sum, victimization data alone may be complicated to use because 1. 
most corruption is hidden from citizens; 2. direct and clear corruption experience is rare; and 3. 
awareness of what is and is not corruption may be lacking on the part of citizens. However, it may be 
quite useful as a way to capture highly specific forms of corruption, especially at low levels of analysis.   
 
Performance-based measures 
 The third broad type of corruption measures are based on government performance.45 These 
are a creative new family of indicators that capture shortfalls between what government should be 
doing and what it actually is doing that are indicative of corruption. One method is to measure the 
difference between goods supposedly distributed to citizens and goods actually received by the target 
population (Olken 2006; Reinikka & Svensson 2004). Another example is to compare the predicted 
                                                          
42
 In Brazil, small cash payments such as these are often referred to as a “cafezinho”, a small coffee. For slightly 
larger amounts, a “cervejinha” (a little beer) is commonly used.   
43
 All of these types of behaviors were reported to me by residents during the period of my fieldwork.  However, 
almost no one identified with the language of “victimhood”; most were reluctant to label anything corruption for 
fear that as a participant, they could be punished.  This is related to the common conception that laws protect the 
powerful and fall heavily on the poor. 
44
 For example, Seligson finds that the percentage of respondents experiencing corrupt practices was low, though 
varied by country: 5% in El Salvador, 9% in Honduras, 15% in Nicaragua, 19% in Ecuador, 22% in Paraguay and 27% 
in Bolivia (2006, 11). 
45
 For other articles using a performance-based measure of corruption, see Olken 2006, 2007, 2009; 
Gorodnichenko & Peter 2007; Reinikka & Svensson 2004; Di Tella & Schargrodsky 2003; Fisman & Wei 2004. 
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consumption possible on government wages to the actual consumption levels of government 
functionaries to identify the receipt of non-reported compensation or bribes (Gorodnichenko & Peter 
2007). And Di Tella and Schargrodsky measure the prices paid by government for basic inputs before 
and during a crackdown on corruption (2003).  
The most valid versions of these measures are based on outside evaluations by independent 
auditors of government programs’ compliance with professional and bureaucratic norms. This type of 
data can be used as a proxy for corruption since it captures the failure of government agents to comply 
with the rules of their profession. As it is program-based, it can also capture corruption in different 
levels of government, allowing for disaggregation between municipal, state and federal authorities. 
While this type of data is limited to strictly evaluating outcomes according to official rules, it is usually 
more neutral, collected more uniformly and more broadly comparable from unit to unit. As this 
measurement is based on the specific performance of the government on measurable tasks and within 
structured settings, it is one of the clearest and most proximate ways to measure corruption in 
subnational government. Performance-based data cannot pretend to capture every instance of 
corruption in a certain government but it can be considered an indicator of corruption levels, 
appropriate for comparison among units. A disadvantage of this type of measurement is that, since it is 
based on particular programs, it is not available at the national level. It may also be costly and/or time-
consuming to produce this type of data. In addition, these measures tend to underestimate corruption, 
since only clear instances of corruption are generally counted as part of the dependent variable so as to 
avoid Type I errors.  
 
Other measures 
 There are several other ways to measure corruption that do not fall neatly into the categories 
discussed above that may be worth considering. For example, one could measure corruption by 
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counting the number of prosecutions or court cases for “corrupt acts” as they are defined by the 
researcher. However, these types of aggregate counts tell more about the stringency of laws, the 
willingness of prosecutors to pursue such cases and the structure of court systems in particular 
countries than they do about the actual existence of corruption. Another measure, used in Pharr (2000), 
analyzes the frequency of reports of corruption in news media. Similarly, this tells more about the 
relative independence of reporters or the popularity of such sensationalistic stories than about 
corruption.  In Latin America, especially, anecdotal evidence seems to directly warn against trusting this 
type of data since some politicians allegedly have paid reporters to write stories accusing their political 
enemies of corruption. Under conditions of high corruption and high levels of violence, courts and 
media may be unable to expose and sanction corruption. As these other measures are less commonly 
used and the data is difficult to collect, this analysis focuses solely on perceptions, victimization and 
performance. 
 
Factors affecting corruption perceptions 
Since most previous studies utilizing measures of corruption perceptions use nationally 
aggregated measures, the most significant explanatory variables are at the system level, including 
economic development, resource dependence, configuration of political institutions and quality of 
democracy. However, the approach in this paper is to look at corruption perceptions on the micro-level, 
identifying what characteristics make perception of corruption more or less likely for individuals. 
Previous literature suggests that a combination of variables may be responsible, including socio-
economic, political and attitudinal factors. For example, in an analysis of survey data from Costa Rica, 
Mexico and Chile, Davis, Camp and Coleman find that corruption perceptions are linked with 
respondents’ party identification, ideological orientation, trust, economic assessments, socioeconomic 
status and size of their community (2004, 692). While the effects of age, socioeconomic status and 
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community size varied across the three countries, they found that in general opposition support, social 
distrust and poor current and future economic assessments were linked to higher perceived corruption 
(ibid.). Using data from Indonesian villages, Olken (2009) observes that individual perceptions of 
corruption are linked to age, gender, social participation, education, levels of trust and income, finding 
in particular that better educated, younger, male, and more participatory citizens perceive more 
corruption. In her study analyzing individual-level survey data of corruption perceptions, Tverdova 
(2011) finds perception of corruption is higher amongst older, male, less-educated and lower income 
respondents; opposition supporters; and those with more negative beliefs about the political system 
and their ability to change it. McCann and Redlawsk find further support for the role of partisanship 
based on data from the United States: pro-government voters tend to perceive corruption in 
government much less seriously than opposition voters, though the effect varies according to the 
knowledge and resources of the individuals (2006, 800). 
One general hypothesis about attitudes that I draw from these findings is that people who feel 
more disadvantaged in the current situation will perceive higher corruption. When citizens feel that 
their lot in life is poor and that the political system does not respond to them, they are more likely to 
see the system as corrupt. Low education, low socio-economic status, dissatisfaction with government 
services and political marginalization are all expected to increase the probability of higher levels of 
corruption perceptions. Thus, in line with Tverdova and Davis, Camp and Coleman, I hypothesize that 
low-income and less-educated individuals will have higher perception levels because they are 
disproportionately affected by corruption in the system. These citizens may be excluded from access to 
certain public goods because of an inability to pay bribes, thus increasing their sensitivity to information 
about corruption. I also hypothesize that people with lower trust in societal organizations and negative 
system evaluations will perceive more corruption. Citizens who did not vote for the current 
administration in power and who distrust other organizations will view corruption as more common. I 
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further expect that several other individual characteristics should be included as controls due to their 
relevance in previous studies, which have found that younger, rural and male tend to perceive more 
corruption. Younger and rural citizens may feel overlooked by an unresponsive political system and thus 
judge it to be corrupt. Having higher levels of political information may also play a role in increasing 
corruption perceptions, especially since the Brazilian media tends to be highly focused on exposing and 
publicizing corruption scandals. These factors may work in concert with the above variables, shaping 
people’s beliefs that the system is responsive to their needs as well as their beliefs about their own 
ability to affect the political system. 
In addition to these characteristics, I also hypothesize that individual experiences with 
corruption will increase perceptions of corruption. Assuming that experience informs perception is not 
without controversy, however. Comparing these two types of data for respondents in 60 countries, 
Weber Abramo finds that on average, respondent opinions do not hold significant relationships with 
experiences of corruption (2008, 4). In an analysis of data from the 2012 Americas Barometer, covering 
about 38,000 respondents in 24 countries, Bohn finds that corruption experience does have a positive, 
significant effect on corruption perceptions (2012, 85). However, this effect is much smaller than the 
effect of attitudinal variables on perceptions, including trust and perceived system efficacy, which are 
also included in my analysis.  
The final major factor that I hypothesize may shape individual corruption perceptions is 
corruption performance of municipal government. If a local government is highly corrupt in its 
bureaucratic dealings and that corruption is known to citizens, then their overall perceptions of 
corruption should be higher. There is some previous evidence to suggest that this is the case. Olken 
finds that villagers’ perceptions of the amount of corruption in road projects do correlate positively and 
significantly with the amount of money missing through corruption on these projects as assessed by 
independent auditors (2009, 951). I expect that the level of corruption detected in subnational 
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government by a performance-based measure should also affect corruption perceptions of residents of 
that locality. By nesting individuals in municipal governments and comparing these two levels of 
measurement, the validity of each may be reinforced if they are seen to covary.  
Individuals’ perceptions of municipal corruption should be significantly positively related to both 
their reported corruption victimization and the calculated rate of corrupt errors found through 
municipal auditing. If their local government is more corrupt, as measured by audit data about the rate 
of corrupt infractions, the respondents should also perceive more corruption. However, average citizens 
in a town may not experience or be aware of corruption in their municipalities that may be revealed by 
municipal audits, so it necessary to include also the individual characteristics described above to account 
for variation amongst populations. Factors that make citizens feel more marginalized by their 
governments should lead them to perceive higher levels of corruption, just as actual detected 
bureaucratic corruption and personal experience with corruption do. 
   
Case selection, data and measurement 
The main data on individual-level variables analyzed in this article is based on 120 interviews 
that I completed in 2009 and 2010 in four Brazilian municipalities in two states in the Southeast region, 
collected in the Biddle Southeast Brazil Corruption database. I chose to study municipalities in this 
region for several reasons. First, the Southeast is the most populated region, representing about 42% of 
the national population in 2007 according to the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE). 
Secondly, since some researchers claim that corruption definitions vary culturally, I wanted to choose a 
single region that shares many similar cultural attributes. In a country as large as Brazil, corruption 
definitions within a rural, isolated municipality dominated by indigenous populations may differ from 
those found within a highly globalized, super-metropolis such as São Paulo. Also, the Southeast region is 
fairly well-developed and cosmopolitan. Of all of the different regions, it would be the one most 
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expected to share “Western”, bureaucratic notions of what constitutes corruption, including particularly 
the distinction between public and private spheres (Sandholtz & Koetzle 2000, 34). In addition, the two 
states analyzed had relatively similar patterns of colonization and Portuguese cultural transfers, which 
should ensure that the influence of historical legacies on corruption would remain constant.  
In the state of Rio de Janeiro, I studied the municipalities of Rio Bonito and Sapucaia. In Minas 
Gerais, the municipalities were Santo Antônio do Monte and Itamogi. These municipalities were 
selected because they were randomly chosen for audits of municipal administration by the federal 
government, which are described in more detail below. These municipalities are all located within a 
roughly 450 mile radius in the middle of the southeastern region. They vary in population from 11,000 to 
55,000 residents. The levels of economic development of these towns are representative of their states 
and regions, ranging from about 7,500 to 16,000 reais per capita. In 2009, the GDP per capita in Brazil as 
a whole was 16,918 reais; Rio de Janeiro was 22,102 reais and Minas Gerais was 14,328 reais. Income is 
distributed unequally in Brazil; large cities and state capitals represent a disproportionately higher GDP 
per capita.46 Thus, the types of municipalities that I studied, of small and medium size, are more 
representative of the levels of development where most of the population lives. 
I spent between one and three months in each municipality, first accompanying the audit 
process used to generate the performance-based corruption measures and then later carrying out public 
opinion surveys. In each town, I interviewed 30 residents from various neighborhoods, socio-economic 
backgrounds, racial mixtures, genders, etc. Respondents were selected randomly through examination 
of the health registry rolls. These rolls are created by community health agents, who keep detailed 
records on residents in their assigned geographic zones (typically 50 – 120 households) through monthly 
door-to-door visits and records of patients attended in local clinics. In each of the four municipalities, 
                                                          
46
 In addition, wealth in Brazil is highly concentrated amongst upper classes the highest 10% had about 43% of the 
wealth, while the lowest 10% had less than 1% according to estimations for 2009. In 2007, the Gini index was 0.52. 
Data from the IBGE and World Bank (World Development Indicators). 
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these zones cover the entire area of the municipality. The rolls are updated on a monthly basis and thus 
represent the most current registry of municipal residents. Calculating the total quantity of people 
registered at each health clinic, I chose a proportionate number of my sample size from each area 
through random selection of every nth entry on the alphabetical rolls.47 I then visited the homes of the 
selected residents requesting interviews until the goal of 30 respondents was met.48 The size of the 
sample was limited by logistical and monetary concerns. Obviously a larger sample size would allow for a 
more sophisticated analysis, as well as higher statistical power in my explanatory models. However, the 
sample was chosen randomly, using the best means available, and every precaution was taken to ensure 
                                                          
47
 I used a random number generator. See Pollock 2003, pp. 97-98 for more information on this sample selection 
method. 
48
 To avoid bias due to non-response, I visited at times before, during and after normal working hours, and made 
appointments when necessary. See Pollock 2003, p. 97. 
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as little bias as possible.49 According to spot checks, these samples appear to reflect the population 
within reasonable limits of variance.50 
The interviews generally lasted from 45 to 90 minutes. The questions were both multiple choice 
and open-ended items; many respondents added their own commentary, which was also recorded 
when relevant. Some of the modules covered include: how the respondent defines corruption; how the 
respondent evaluates municipal services; trust in societal organizations; support for democracy; political 
involvement and behavior; victimization; and socio-economic profile (age, gender, employment status, 
income, education, and race). The overall goal of such comprehensive interviews was not just to gather 
quantitative data on the variables of interest, but also to listen to people’s stories about these questions 
in order to better illustrate the context that these variables operate in. In addition to the relatively long 
periods that I spent living in each municipality and the extensive contact that I had with politicians and 
                                                          
49
 I first attempted to select respondents based on estimates of municipal population collected by the IBGE in 
2007. The population data was broken down by census districts roughly the size of a few streets. I first proposed to 
use the population weights of these districts relative to the municipality as a whole to proportionately, randomly 
select districts, then streets within districts, then house numbers on streets, until the desired sample size was 
reached. However, I soon found that this method was impractical. First, this data is not census data, which is more 
likely to capture all residents, but estimated counts. The most recent census data available was from 2000, clearly 
not current enough to apply to residence patterns in 2009 and 2010. I found that even the data from the 2007 
estimates did not reflect existing patterns of residence in the municipalities studied. Isolated, new and illegal 
settlements were excluded, leading to a systematic bias against sampling the most precarious and marginalized 
households. Next, it became clear that many areas did not have official or recognized street names or even streets, 
neither in the 2007 data nor in official maps of the IBGE, making random selection difficult without mapping in 
person each particular district. Further, house numbers were non-sequential, inexistent or alphanumeric, with no 
discernible patterns. I determined the difficulties of this method to be insurmountable. I briefly considered 
telephone and/or internet surveys, but these would also lead to highly biased samples in the municipalities I 
studied. For the reasons stated above, I opted for the community health rolls as the least problematic method of 
sampling.  
50
 The table below illustrates some of the sample statistics vs. official statistics. Although not completely 
comparable, they do show that the sample is largely congruent with the population within reasonable limits.
 
variable sample official sample official sample official sample official
rural 7.14% 25.7%* 25.81% 14.60%* 30.00% 25%* 3.30% 24.26%*
male 46.43% 49.2%* 45.16% 50.80%* 46.67% 51.30%* 43.30% 50.00%*
incumbent vote 42.86% 46.75% 74.19% 71.73% 70.00% 53.09% 63.30% 95.00%
* these data are for the entire population based the 2010 census, therefore they are not completely comparable to the 
sample data, which is a sample only of voters.
Rio Bonito
Santo Antônio do 
Monte Itamogi Sapucaia
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public servants at these sites, the in-depth interviews and qualitative observations help to validate my 
quantitative results.      
 
Dependent variable 
The dependent variable is citizens’ perceptions of corruption in municipal government. It is 
measured through an index averaging responses on three survey items. Respondents were asked: 
On a scale of 0 – 9, with zero signifying “very honest” and nine signifying “very corrupt”, how corrupt do 
you consider….? 
1. your municipal government;  
2. your town council; and  
3. your mayor?   
Each of these items asks about an essential portion of municipal government: bureaucracy, legislative 
and executive branches. The overall perception measure was created by averaging responses on these 
three questions. The Cronbach’s alpha of this measure, which determines the internal consistency or 
average correlation of items in a scale to determine its reliability was 0.81, indicating good reliability. 
The sample mean of the perception measure was about 4, indicating that on average citizens believe 
that their local governments are neither very corrupt nor very honest. However, there was significant 
variation among the municipalities, with averages ranging from 5.9 to 3.4 (see Table 2.1). The highest 
average aggregated perceptions were found in Rio Bonito and the lowest in Itamogi, with Rio Bonito 
showing a considerably higher level of perceived corruption. 
 
Independent variables 
My indicator of corruption victimization follows from Seligson (2006). In this and other projects, 
researchers have found that victimization is best captured by asking citizens whether they have 
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experienced any one of several common types of corruption, rather than just questioning them about 
corruption in general.  Specifically, the types of corruption that are included are those most likely to be 
experienced by regular citizens of Latin American democracies.  These items were as follows: 
In the last year, [if you experienced this situation or used this service],  
1. did any police officer ask you for a bribe or tip?  
2. did you see anyone bribe or tip a police officer? 
3. did any public servant ask you for a bribe? 
4. did you see anyone bribe a public servant? 
5. did a functionary ask for money to avoid cutting off your electricity? 
6. if you interacted with the municipal government, were you asked to pay any money above 
what is required by law? 
7. if you had any case in the justice system, were you asked to pay a bribe? 
8. if you used the public health system, were you asked to pay a bribe or tip? 
9. if you had a child in public school, were you asked to pay a tip or bribe? 
In addition to these more standard items about common forms of corruption that respondents 
may have experienced, I also asked an open-ended item about whether they had seen any other type of 
corruption in the past year.  For those who responded “yes” and described an action that was in fact 
corrupt, I also awarded them a point on the dummy variable for corruption experience. The accepted 
responses were: witness to vote buying/selling; paying a fee for preferential or expedited service from 
public employees; and witness to diversion of public funds or goods. Vague, unspecified or imprecise 
answers, such as “I saw corruption in political campaigns”, were not counted as corruption experience. 
Thus, if a person received a score of one on the dummy variable for corruption experience, then he or 
she has experienced one or more of the most common forms of corruption on the local level. 
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Previous research on trust and corruption perceptions has found that those respondents with 
high levels of trust in individuals and institutions are less likely to perceive corruption (Davis et. al 2004; 
Seligson 1999). To capture individuals’ level of trust in societal organizations, I constructed another 
index from an average of several items where respondents rated their level of trust in various societal 
institutions from 0 (no trust) to 7 (a lot of trust). The results were then averaged from their responses to 
these items to generate their average institutional trust, which ranged from a low of 1.33 to a high of 7. 
The Cronbach’s alpha, was 0.7, indicating that these items are likely to be measuring the same 
underlying variable, trust in societal organizations and that a scale is appropriate. The institutions 
mentioned in the survey included the Landless Movement (Movimento dos Sem-Terra or MST), the 
Catholic Church, unions, the media, indigenous movements, businessmen, etc. These institutions were 
selected since they are all institutions that are non-governmental, yet prominent within Brazilian 
society. At the time of my analysis, many of these institutions were critically perceived by the Brazilian 
public. A high trust in these institutions would indicate that the respondent fits a trusting profile, which 
may mean that they are also hesitant to form negative perceptions of governmental institutions.     
The final attitudinal variable, local government performance, captures the respondents’ rating 
of municipal government services. The actual question asked respondents to evaluate the overall quality 
of services provided by the municipal government. The options for responses were very bad, bad, 
neither good nor bad, good and very good, coded from 1 to 5. The average responses for each town 
ranged from about 2 to about 2.8, indicating that on average, municipal services are rated fairly 
negatively by citizens. The highest average evaluation of service was found in Santo Antônio do Monte; 
interestingly, this municipality also had the lowest rate of serious errors on the government 
performance-based corruption measure, which is explained further below.   
Most of the data on the remaining individual-level variables and controls were taken directly 
from information provided by respondents to the survey questions, including age, education (years of 
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schooling), dummy for male and income (household income per capita). The dummy for rural 
respondents is based on the IBGE’s classification of the respondents’ locale of residence; the only 
options are urban or rural. Political information is captured via a dummy variable for respondents who 
report reading newspapers and/or magazines with political news.51 Incumbent vote is a dummy variable 
that takes on the value of one if the respondent reported having voted for the current mayor in the 
previous election cycle, in 2004.  
 
Macro-level variable 
In order to capture corruption in municipal government, I use a performance-based measure 
that is constructed from government audit data produced by the Controladoria-Geral da União (CGU) or 
Office of the Comptroller General. The audits evaluate the use of federal funds in municipalities 
according to their compliance with laws and professional norms. Each program is analyzed for its probity 
and all irregularities are recorded. The evidence considered includes accounts documentation, receipts, 
inspections on location and interviews with citizens on the quality of service provision. The major 
advantages to this measure are that the data is basically neutral, collected uniformly and based on 
access to documents and information available for no other performance indicator.52 The CGU data is 
neutral because municipalities are randomly selected by lottery for audits. These audits are conducted 
by the technical corps of the CGU, career employees of the federal government who are outsiders to the 
municipalities evaluated and held to strict standards of political neutrality. The data is comparable 
across municipalities because it is collected using set questionnaires and procedures that ensure that 
the same criteria are applied in each unit. In addition, the CGU teams have more access to information 
                                                          
51
 The particular item asked respondents to report if they read any newspaper or magazine and if so, to specify 
which. Sports newspapers and celebrity tabloids were not classified as sources of political information.  
52
 See CGU (2013) for more information on the audit program, including how municipalities are selected and how 
audits are conducted. 
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than any other performance-based measure; they have the power to requisition confidential 
documentation from banks, municipal governments, tax rolls, company registries and other sources.  
 The government audit data is summarized in publicly available reports, which I coded for the 
frequency of irregularities indicative of corruption. The coding criteria are based on Ferraz and Finan and 
are described as follows:  
For the purpose of coding irregularities, we deﬁne political corruption to be any irregularity 
associated with fraud in procurements, diversion of public funds, and over-invoicing. 
Speciﬁcally, we deﬁne a procurement to be irregular if: i) a required procurement was not 
executed; ii) the minimum number of bids was not attained; iii) there was evidence of fraud 
in the procurement process (e.g. use of bids from non-existing ﬁrms). We categorize 
diversion of public funds as any expenditure without proof of purchase or provision and/or 
direct evidence of diversion provided by the CGU. Finally, we deﬁne over-invoicing as any 
evidence that public goods and services were bought for a value above the market price 
(2007, 15-16).53 
 
Any error cited by the CGU reports that fits into these categories was counted as a serious error 
indicative of corruption.  I then controlled for the number of programs analyzed in order to get a 
measure capturing the rate of corruption found by auditors.  
Overall, corruption based on municipal performance in the four towns analyzed here is fairly 
congruent with other municipalities of their size and in their states.54 In these cases, the corrupt error 
rates ranged from 0.22 errors per program analyzed to 0.5 errors per program, slightly lower than the 
national average. These results are also consistent with the observation that on average municipalities 
in the state of Minas Gerais tend to be fairly low corruption; in the state of Rio de Janeiro, average 
municipal corruption is moderate.55  
                                                          
53
 Studies that use the Ferraz and Finan or another closely-related measure include Ferraz & Finan 2008; Pereira, 
Melo & Figueiredo 2009; and Colaço Alves & Azevedo Sodré 2008. 
54
 I accompanied all four of these audits in process. I also questioned the CGU analysts responsible afterwards, 
completing about 25 interviews with them. All had experience completing audits, many having worked for the CGU 
for several years and in various states. These analysts all said that the four audits here were normal for their 
regions and that the levels of corruption found were pretty typical for these types of municipalities. 
55
 See my article “Causes of Municipal Corruption: The case of Brazil” for more. 
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There were two kinds of errors indicative of corruption found in all four municipalities. The first 
involved medical personnel who exercise multiple competencies within the public health system (at 
times with obligatory schedules of over 100 hours per week) and regularly receive payments for hours 
not actually worked. The second corrupt error common to all locations concerned employees of the 
prefeitura who were receiving monthly cash benefits from the federal government through the means-
tested Bolsa Família although they did not qualify for the program due to income over the limit specified 
for eligibility. Otherwise, there were variations in the patterns of serious errors. In Rio Bonito, the most 
common form of corruption indicated by the CGU reports involved fraud in procurement. For example, 
various pieces of equipment bought with public funds and verified in situ were actually of different (and 
inferior) brands and specifications from the equipment that was supposedly purchased and received. In 
Santo Antônio do Monte, there were fewer signs of problems overall, though there was one case where 
goods purchased by the municipality were bought for a price far above market value (superfaturamento, 
or over-invoicing). In Itamogi, most indications of corruption were also in bidding processes. In one case, 
the municipal employee who elaborated a project plan was the same person to win the project contract. 
Other solicitations for bids were publicized only through notices on a bulletin board inside the guarded 
prefeitura, indicating an improper restriction of competition and favoritism. In Sapucaia, there were a 
few instances of the improper movement of funds through municipal accounts and a lack of receipts 
proving that the funds were used for legitimate purposes.   
   Table 2.1 summarizes the descriptive statistics for the variables analyzed here. They are 
presented both by municipality and by overall sample. These summary measures indicate that the 
sample is diverse, capturing individuals with various different configurations of characteristics that may 
influence perceptions. It also demonstrates that there appear to be significant differences across the 
four municipalities on corruption measures. Rio Bonito (RJ) has the highest average levels on all three 
indicators: perceptions, rate of victimization and rate of serious performance errors. Santo Antônio do 
 
 
73 
 
Monte (MG) has the second-highest levels of corruption perceptions, but the lowest rate of corrupt 
errors on the performance measure and the second-lowest rate of victimization. Sapucaia (RJ) has the 
second-highest frequency of victimization, the second lowest average perceptions and the second-
lowest rate of performance-based corruption. Finally, Itamogi (MG) has the lowest reported frequency 
of corruption victimization, the second-highest rate of corruption violations on the performance 
measure and the lowest reported corruption perceptions. Together, these statistics do not offer a clear 
picture of the relationship between these three measures, though there are some suggestive 
combinations. In the next section, these relationships are tested empirically with controls for individual 
characteristics that may condition corruption perceptions. 
  
 
 
74 
 
 T
ab
le
 2
.1
: D
es
cr
ip
ti
ve
 s
ta
ti
st
ic
s 
of
 k
ey
 v
ar
ia
bl
es
 b
y 
m
un
ic
ip
al
it
y 
an
d 
ov
er
al
l s
am
pl
e
M
un
ic
ip
al
it
y 
1:
M
un
ic
ip
al
it
y 
2:
M
un
ic
ip
al
it
y 
3:
M
un
ic
ip
al
it
y 
4:
O
ve
ra
ll 
sa
m
pl
e
Ri
o 
Bo
ni
to
, R
J
Sa
nt
o 
A
nt
ôn
io
 d
o 
M
on
te
, M
G
It
am
og
i, 
M
G
Sa
pu
ca
ia
, R
J
M
IC
RO
-l
ev
el
D
um
m
y 
va
ri
ab
le
s
co
un
t
co
un
t
co
un
t
co
un
t
co
un
t
(p
er
ce
nt
ag
e)
(p
er
ce
nt
ag
e)
(p
er
ce
nt
ag
e)
(p
er
ce
nt
ag
e)
(p
er
ce
nt
ag
e)
M
al
e
13
14
14
13
54
(4
6.
43
%
)
(4
5.
16
%
)
(4
6.
67
%
)
(4
3.
30
%
)
(4
5.
38
%
)
Ru
ra
l
2
8
9
1
20
(7
.1
4%
)
(2
5.
81
%
)
(3
0.
00
%
)
(3
.3
0%
)
(1
6.
81
%
)
In
cu
m
be
nt
 v
ot
e
12
23
21
19
75
(4
2.
86
%
)
(7
4.
19
%
)
(7
0.
00
%
)
(6
3.
30
%
)
(6
3.
03
%
)
Po
lit
ic
al
 p
re
ss
10
8
4
7
29
(3
5.
71
%
)
(2
5.
81
%
)
(1
3.
33
%
)
(2
3.
30
%
)
(2
4.
37
%
)
Co
rr
up
ti
on
 v
ic
ti
m
iz
at
io
n
11
4
1
9
25
(3
9.
29
%
)
(1
2.
90
%
)
(3
.3
0%
)
(3
0.
00
%
)
(2
1.
00
%
)
O
th
er
 v
ar
ia
bl
es
m
ea
n
m
ea
n
m
ea
n
m
ea
n
m
ea
n
(m
in
im
um
 - 
m
ax
im
um
)
(m
in
im
um
 - 
m
ax
im
um
)
(m
in
im
um
 - 
m
ax
im
um
)
(m
in
im
um
 - 
m
ax
im
um
)
(m
in
im
um
 - 
m
ax
im
um
)
Ci
ti
ze
ns
' c
or
ru
pt
io
n 
pe
rc
ep
ti
on
5.
89
3.
62
3.
43
3.
56
4.
09
(0
 - 
9.
00
)
(0
 - 
8.
67
)
(0
 - 
7.
67
)
(0
 - 
8.
00
)
(0
 - 
9.
00
)
Tr
us
t i
n 
in
st
it
ut
io
ns
3.
88
4.
40
4.
08
4.
56
4.
16
(1
.6
0 
- 6
.1
7)
(1
.8
0 
- 7
.0
0)
(2
.1
7 
- 6
.3
3)
(1
.3
3 
- 6
.1
7)
(1
.3
3 
- 7
.0
0)
A
ge
39
.7
1
47
.6
2
42
.3
0
44
.7
7
43
.7
0
(2
0 
- 7
2)
(2
0 
- 7
2)
(1
9 
- 7
6)
(1
8 
- 7
3)
(1
8 
- 7
6)
Ed
uc
at
io
n
7.
25
5.
71
7.
30
7.
47
6.
92
(0
 - 
16
)
(0
 - 
18
)
(3
 - 
16
)
(0
 - 
14
)
(0
 - 
18
)
In
co
m
e
56
3.
73
74
1.
15
37
5.
94
55
3.
63
56
0.
06
(4
2.
50
 - 
20
40
.0
0)
(8
5.
00
 - 
61
20
.0
0)
(6
3.
75
 -7
65
.0
0)
 
(8
5.
00
 - 
15
30
)
(4
2.
50
 - 
61
20
.0
0)
Lo
ca
l g
ov
er
nm
en
t p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
2.
04
2.
77
2.
57
2.
27
2.
42
(0
 - 
4)
(0
 - 
4)
(0
 - 
4)
(0
 - 
4)
(0
 - 
4)
N
28
31
30
30
11
9
M
A
CR
O
-l
ev
el
M
un
ic
ip
al
 g
ov
er
nm
en
t c
or
ru
pt
io
n 
ra
te
0.
50
0.
22
0.
44
0.
24
0.
35
 
 
75 
 
Model results and discussion  
 In order to analyze the relationship between the various measures of corruption and the 
characteristics that influence them, I constructed a multi-level model where citizens are nested within 
the four municipalities studied. The dependent variable of interest is citizens’ perceptions of corruption 
in municipal government, which was measured as described above. On the macro-level of the 
municipality, I included the independent variable capturing the performance-based corruption rate 
created from the CGU audit data.  On the micro-level, I included a set of controls for demographic 
factors that have been seen as important in previous studies, including age, income, gender, education 
and urban/rural. In order to test the effect of personal experience of corruption on a respondent’s 
corruption perception, I included a dummy variable for any type of corruption that a respondent 
experienced, as explained above.56 Other explanatory variables included captured political and 
attitudinal factors: political information, incumbent vote, government performance evaluations and 
trust in societal organizations. The results of the models are summarized in Table 2.2 below. Model 1 
included all of the explanatory and control variables and Model 2 is a trimmed model of only the 
variables expected to have the most significant effects on corruption perceptions.   
  
                                                          
56
 I also tested for the effects of social participation, race, unemployment and political interest. None of these 
variables reached significance in any model specification.   
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Table 2.2: Results for multi-level model estimates of citizens' perceptions of corruption in municipal 
government 
Independent Variable Model 1 Model 2 
      
MACRO-level 
 
  
Municipal government corruption rate 1.69*** 1.48*** 
rate of serious errors per program detected by audits (0.77) (0.71) 
  
 
  
MICRO-level 
 
  
Age -0.02 -0.20* 
expressed in years (0.01) (0.01) 
Gender 0.12   
dummy variable for male (0.32)   
Education 0.02   
years of schooling (0.05)   
Income 0.00   
household income per person (0.00)   
Urban/rural 0.61   
dummy variable for rural (0.45)   
Corruption experience -0.35 -0.59 
dummy variable for reported personal experience of corruption (0.43) (0.44) 
Political information 0.89* 0.71* 
dummy variable indicating respondent reads political news (0.40) (0.31) 
Incumbent vote -0.70* -0.83* 
dummy variable indicating a vote for the current mayor (0.35) (0.37) 
Trust in societal organizations -0.72*** -0.46*** 
index of the respondent's trust in societal organizations (0.14) (0.14) 
Local government performance -0.76*** -0.81*** 
rating of municipal government services (0.18) (0.18) 
Constant 6.23*** 9.42*** 
  (1.13) (0.87) 
  
 
  
AIC 492.30 502.43 
BIC 527.43 527.44 
N observations 119 119 
N groups 4 4 
p<0.001***; p<0.01**; p<0.05*; p<0.1†; Analysis performed in Stata 12 SE. 
 
  
The control variables for the characteristics of respondents, age, gender, education, income, and 
urban/rural did not reach significance in Model 1. The closest to reaching the level of significance, age, 
was included in the trimmed model, where it is significant and negatively related to perceptions. This 
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indicates that younger respondents perceive more corruption than older respondents, providing support 
for a life cycle effect. Because younger citizens work, send their kids to school, build houses, etc. they 
have greater contact with government bureaucracy, in contrast to older cohorts who are less actively 
engaged with society. More contact leads to higher perceptions of corruption. In addition, I observed 
that many older respondents who had grown up under the military dictatorship that lasted from 1964 to 
the late-1980s tended to be less interested in and critical of government, perhaps because they had 
been conditioned not to challenge or question a repressive regime. This is consistent with survey 
research that young people in Brazil tend to consider more situations as instances of corruption than 
older respondents (Almeida 2007, 62).57 
 The political characteristics of individuals all reached significance with the same direction of 
effect on perceptions in Models 1 and 2. As expected, trust in societal organizations had a significant 
negative effect on corruption perception. This supports the idea that citizens with a generally trusting, 
non-critical profile are less likely to perceive corruption as pervasive. Political information had a 
significant positive effect on perceptions of corruption; respondents who were more interested and 
informed on politics tended to see more corruption in municipal government. Incumbent vote was also 
significant, with the expected effect. Citizens that had voted for the current mayor were less critical and 
perceived less corruption in the municipal administration. Similarly, respondents who rated municipal 
services as better quality had significantly lower levels of perceived corruption. This provides evidence 
for the argument that citizens who approve of the government and judge that it is performing well 
perceive less corruption in municipal government. This could be because publics who feel they are 
represented by or benefitting from government are less likely to recognize government acts as corrupt 
and/or to ignore indications of corruption in order to avoid cognitive dissonance. 
                                                          
57
 Almeida finds that older respondents are less likely to classify the following as instances of corruption: asking a 
friend who works in public services to get a document more rapidly than normal; a public employee who receives a 
Christmas present from a company that he helped to win a government contract; and someone gets their 
government loan expedited because they have a relative who works in government. 
 
 
78 
 
 The relationships between the different measures of corruption in the model are interesting. In 
both models, the effects of experience and corruption performance on perceptions remain consistent in 
significance, direction and even magnitude of the estimated coefficients. However, these effects differ 
greatly in consequence. Municipal government corruption rate had a significant, positive effect on 
individuals’ perceptions even while controlling for other individual-level characteristics. Thus, 
perceptions of municipal corruption are related to the level of corruption in government captured by 
the more-objective performance measure. This provides increased validity for both measures, 
suggesting that each portrays some aspect of the underlying latent variable of corruption. It appears 
that performance-based measures are effective in indicating relative corruption levels and that citizens’ 
perceptions are at least partially based on this reality as well.  
However, in contrast, victimization had no significant effect on perceptions when controlling for 
other variables. These results were consistent even when other attitudinal measures that may be 
correlated with victimization, such as government performance evaluations and trust in societal 
organizations, were removed from the model. As further evidence, we can see that the effect of 
victimization failed to reach significance even in Model 2, which removed several demographic features 
that are correlated with the likelihood of victimization, and thus may have been “soaking up” the 
influence of that variable. These results may be due to the low rate of respondents who admitting to 
experiencing corruption, which was only 21% of the sample. Given the problem of zero inflation, due to 
the very low number of respondents who responded that they had experienced corruption, it would be 
difficult statistically-speaking to reach any significant result for this variable. There may simply not be 
enough information available about this portion of the sample to reach statistical significance. Since not 
enough respondents reported direct experiences of corruption, it is not statistically possible to make 
inferences about this population. A larger sample could help to mitigate this issue in future research. But 
these concerns aside, the results are consistent with previous research, which shows that perceptions 
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and experience are not always linked. Direct evidence of corruption is not the most important 
determinant of perception; people employ complex political reasoning, gathering information from 
many sources in order to shape their attitudes. And, these findings are consistent with performance-
based measures of corruption, such as the one employed here. 
 
Conclusion 
In this article, I examined the sources of individual perceptions of corruption in local 
governance. I drew on source data from government audit reports, as well as case studies and surveys 
of citizens in four Brazilian municipalities. I found that, while controlling for individual-level 
characteristics, the performance-based measure of municipal corruption had a significant positive 
relationship with corruption perceptions, while personal experience of corruption did not. I also found 
significant effects of several political variables on corruption perceptions, including support for 
incumbent, government performance ratings, political information and organizational trust. Overall, 
respondents who felt excluded perceived higher corruption generally. 
This analysis contributes new information to corruption research because it compares the 
micro- and meso-foundations of corruption measures within a specific context. By including as units of 
analysis both the individual and the government structure in which he/she is nested, we can get a fuller 
picture of how corruption attitudes are formed. These attitudes depend on the level of corruption that 
respondents see in their communities, how represented they feel by their government, their exposure 
to political information and their overall distrust of societal organizations. Citizens’ perceptions of 
corruption are shaped by the corruption actually going on in their local governments, according to the 
results linking perceptions and the performance-based corruption measure. Thus, while perceived 
through the filter of their political attitudes, people are taking in information about the state of local 
affairs, and forming opinions based on this evidence. 
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I do advocate the further development of performance-based measures of corruption; these 
measures make valid and novel contributions to the other attempts to measure corruption that are 
more common in the literature. By uncovering types of corruption that citizens do not perceive or that 
are essentially “victimless”, performance-based measures can be juxtaposed with the other measures to 
see if the hypothesized relationships between corruption (as captured by these measures) and other 
factors still hold. It is also important to clarify that this analysis does not attempt to draw conclusions 
about what is the “best” measure of corruption. Rather, I described the advantages and disadvantages 
of each measure and suggested situations in which choosing one measure over another might be 
preferable. By illustrating more about the complex relationships between various measures, researchers 
may be able to discern how to combine measures and better interpret their significance in future works.  
One interesting example of this type of investigation would be an analysis of the relationship 
between corruption performance and political participation. When corruption is measured through 
perceptions, political participation decreases in environments with high corruption. Would that 
relationship still hold true for performance measures and participation? If so, there may be a mediated 
relationship whereby corruption performance acts on political participation through its effect on the 
intermediate variable, perceptions. Or it could be that underlying corruption, as indicated by corruption 
performance, actually prevents citizens from participating by closing avenues of access and distancing 
government from the public in the interests of maintaining secrecy. Investigating the implications of 
both of these hypotheses could be highly informative. 
Public opinion variables are notoriously difficult to understand and model. Some researchers 
even argue that “most of what gets measured as public opinion does not exist except in the presence of 
a pollster” (Zaller 1992, 265). Even if we assume a less-skeptical approach, it is difficult to validate 
measures of public opinion without showing consistency between and among many different measures. 
In the case of corruption, there are several different ways that this may be done. In this article, a multi-
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level model was utilized to relate characteristics about municipal government corruption to individual-
level opinions and experiences. Other approaches might involve bringing in other units of analysis, such 
as state and national, to test for correlations of corruption measures at these levels. We could further 
explore what types of corruption information or experiences are most powerful in determining global 
and specific corruption perceptions. 
 Looking at how corruption perceptions are formed, as this paper does, allows us to understand 
more about who feels most disenfranchised or doubtful about governments. It also illuminates what 
experiences may lead individuals to react against high levels of corruption. This research further adds a 
productive contribution to research on “distrusting democrats”, critical citizens and “rational-choice 
corruptors” (Bohn 2012, 74). As mass publics begin to demonstrate against government corruption, as 
they recently have in places as diverse as Brazil, Egypt, Bulgaria, India and Spain, the issue of popular 
perceptions of corruption can only take on more importance. Understanding the links between 
perceptions, experience and performance will help us to better study and understand these citizens and 
their grievances. 
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CHAPTER 3: “PARA INGLÊS VER”?:58 EVALUATING A BRAZILIAN ANTI-CORRUPTION AGENCY 
 
Introduction 
Since the early 2000s, there has been a new preoccupation with governance in the international 
financial and development communities, both within their own organizations and in the projects that 
they support. Accordingly, the international financial institutions, aid organizations, development bodies 
and donor countries have all made combatting corruption a priority. Like structural adjustment reforms 
in the 1990s, improving governance and especially controlling corruption have become conditions upon 
which aid and loans are granted to countries in need.59 This new focus has yielded international 
conferences, new non-governmental organizations and several treaties, including most importantly the 
Organization of American States’ (OAS) Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, United Nations 
(UN) Convention Against Corruption, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
Anti-bribery Convention, Convention of the African Union to Prevent and Combat Corruption and the 
Council of Europe’s Civil and Criminal Law Conventions on Corruption. The first of these, the Inter-
American Convention Against Corruption of 1996, requires signatories to create “legal and public policy 
                                                          
58
 Literally, “for the English to see”, this phrase is used to describe laws that exist, but are not complied with in 
practice. The phrase is reputed to have originated when the English, having abolished slavery in 1807, forced 
several of their trading partners, including Brazil, to also abolish slavery so that English prices would not be 
undercut. Brazil duly passed a law in 1831 declaring Africans arriving after that date to be free. The law was never 
enforced in fact; slavery was actually abolished in 1888.  
59
 This may be a problematic condition for some countries as they fall into a low-resource trap and lack even the 
funds to control corruption (Andvig 2005).  According to Arndt and Oman at least one donor country stopped aid 
due to a highly corrupt score on the Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (2006, 48).  See 
Andersson and Heywood for more information on how the CPI is used to condition aid and loans, and their fear 
that “as aid becomes increasingly conditional on the adoption of Western-defined measures to combat corruption, 
so those countries with the least resources to implement ‘good governance’ stand to suffer most from the 
withdrawal of precisely the support they need to stand any realistic chance of tackling corruption”(2009, 760). 
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actions to promote and strengthen the development of mechanisms necessary to prevent, detect, 
sanction and eradicate corruption” (OAS). The UN convention requires the establishment of anti-
corruption agencies (ACAs) for the purposes of law enforcement and prevention.60 
This focus on corruption and conditional requirements to create ACAs has resulted in an 
explosion of new control and monitoring bodies throughout the world. The International Association of 
Anti-Corruption Agencies, created in 2006, has over 300 organizational members; the International 
Association of Supreme Audit Institutions has over 190 members.61 It is unclear what the real effect of 
this proliferation of agencies has had on corruption, though the apparent results are dismal as most 
countries continue to decline on measures such as Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions 
Index. Despite comprehensive handbooks published by the OECD and UN Development Program on 
evaluating anti-corruption agencies (ACAs), it is also uncertain how much the institutional design 
matters to the efficacy of the agency.  
In order to fill in some of these gaps, in this article I present a case study about one such agency, 
the Controladoria Geral da União (CGU). Founded in Brazil in 2001,62 this ACA is similar to many others 
throughout the world, with a design based on the multi-purpose agency model. As the executive agency 
to combat corruption, the CGU is the most visible international and domestic face of the Brazilian 
government’s “national integrity system”, a phrase coined by Transparency International to describe the 
parts of a country’s governance system that contribute to fighting corruption in government and society. 
This agency has now existed for over a dozen years and has undergone various reforms and re-
                                                          
60
 UNCAC, http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Convention/08-50026_E.pdf, p. 10. 
61
 See http://www.iaaca.org/ and http://www.intosai.org/about-us.html for more on these organizations. 
62
 Although originally founded in 2001 as the “Corregedoria Geral da União”, in 2003 this organization was re-
organized and re-named the “Controladoria Geral da União”. In this article, I consider these essentially the same 
institution, although subject to some changes over time.   
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organizations, all intended to make it stronger and more effective in combatting and preventing 
corruption.  
Using an approach inspired by historical institutionalism, I look beyond simply the formal rules 
governing the CGU to evaluate its performance and identify institutional strengths and weakness. I find 
that despite a clearly stated mandate, wide jurisdiction, high capacity and ample resources, the CGU 
fails to adequately affect corruption due to its weakness on enforcement and prevention. I argue that 
this weakness is primarily due to institutional design, rather than a difficult position in the larger 
institutional framework. Based on an examination of the underlying conditions and the history of the 
CGU, I trace the origins and evolution of the institution. I find that manipulations of the CGU provided a 
shield that for the executive when threatened by legislative and public accountability. While these 
changes to the CGU were substantive on paper, I show that the overall development of the institution 
exhibits significant path dependence and stability. The continued lack of credible enforcement and 
independence, reforms which could have been more costly to the actors involved, kept the CGU from 
ever becoming truly effective. 
The case of Brazil is particularly relevant to the debate about controlling corruption for several 
reasons. First, according to the World Bank, Brazil makes up over 34% of the population and over 42% of 
the GDP of the Latin America and Caribbean region,63 giving it significant symbolic, economic and 
political power among its neighbors. Brazil’s Gini coefficient, after years of successful efforts to decrease 
inequality, is close to Latin America’s regional average of 0.5. The country’s history in the last few 
decades also exhibits similarities to the experience of many other countries in the area. Brazil’s 25-year 
period of military dictatorship ended with the adoption of a democratic constitution in 1988 and free 
and fair elections for president in 1989. Since this phase, the country has grappled with the problem of 
consolidating democracy in the face of challenges common to many Latin American countries: hyper-
                                                          
63
 These figures are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database, available at 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx. 
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inflation, high unemployment, low levels of educational attainment and the dislocations produced by 
neoliberal reforms. Brazil’s new institutions have now managed to hold up under the challenge of a 
presidential impeachment and four executive transitions (three of which were from one political party 
to an opposing party). 
However, despite the overall positive picture of stability, several serious flaws exist in Brazilian 
democracy. According to a Latinobarómetro (LB) public opinion survey carried out in 2005, Brazilians 
think that on average 62 out of 100 public officials are corrupt. The same survey showed that many, 
over 74% of respondents, have experience with corruption, either first-hand or through relatives. In the 
2011 survey, 58% of Latin Americans said that they prefer democracy, while only 45% of Brazilians did 
(LB). In addition, when asked what democracy lacks in their country, 58% of Brazilians answered 
corruption reduction, compared to 48% in the region as a whole (ibid). As several previous studies have 
found strong links between corruption perceptions, regime legitimacy and political participation 
(Seligson 2002; Anderson & Tverdova 2003; Davis, Camp & Coleman 2004), corruption emerges as a 
strong obstacle to making democracy more meaningful in this region and in Brazil particularly. The 
protests that erupted in major Brazilian cities in June of 2013 began over transportation costs, but as the 
demonstrations grew, citizens shifted to broader demands for less corruption in government (Romero 
2013). Currently, the Brazilian government has dozens of departments meant to combat corruption, 
including the CGU. According to the public, these agencies are falling far short of success.  
   The primary data for my analysis comes from fieldwork completed in Brazil between 2009 and 
2011. During this time, I accompanied five major actions of the CGU in two different states, for a total 
period of about ten weeks. I also conducted over 25 interviews with CGU functionaries and supervisors 
in two states and the federal capital. Further, I observed and interviewed 20 leaders of anti-corruption 
NGOs, employees in several federal ministries and academics working in the field. The secondary 
information that I examined includes news articles from 1992 to 2013, archival research and over 840 
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CGU audit reports that I read and analyzed. Using this data, both qualitative and quantitative, provides a 
deep case study of a single anti-corruption agency with implications for research of other institutions 
within Brazil and on ACAs elsewhere. 
The article begins by summarizing some general approaches to studying institutions, theories of 
institutional strength and tools to analyze anti-corruption agencies specifically. Guided by these 
considerations, I examine what the CGU currently looks like. I then look at what it produces, evaluating 
how well the agency accomplishes its stated goal of combatting corruption and where it falls short. I 
then examine some explanations for the CGU’s ineffectiveness, including whether it is due to a lack of 
resources, an inhospitable position in the institutional climate or due to its design. I then trace the major 
moments of evolution in the CGU, including pre-existing conditions, previous institutional models, its 
creation and reform periods. This provides evidence for the argument of design through exploring the 
pressures and interests of the principal actors involved. In conclusion, I expand on the implications of my 
analysis within Brazil and for other cases. 
 
Studying institutions 
In order to analyze the origin and evolution of the CGU, I begin with what Hall and Taylor call the 
historical approach to examining institutions (1996). This approach assumes that institutions are created 
in a world that is already full of institutions – both formal and informal. It emphasizes how institutional 
creation borrows from existing templates, rather than designing new models based solely on efficient 
outcomes. However, this approach also emphasizes that institutions are shaped by existing power 
relations among actors. Thus, the changing interests and relative power of actors conditions the ability 
of different groups to affect institutions (Thelen 2003, 213). This can lead to unexpected outcomes and 
institutional conversion over time. 
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Building from this approach, Levitsky and Murillo (2009) argue that in the Latin American 
context, institutions are not always effective or efficient at producing the expected or stated outcomes. 
While actors may write formal rules creating institutions for stated goals, they are not always reflected 
in corresponding behavior. Thus, examining only the stated goals of an institution does not give an 
accurate picture of de facto operations or the strength of an institution. They identify two key 
dimensions of institutional strength, enforcement and stability. By enforcement, the authors mean the 
extent to which formal and written rules are complied with in practice. By stability, they mean durability 
of institutions, not just over time but also through changing conditions – such as power and preference 
distributions. The authors argue that “rules of similar design but distinct levels of enforcement [and/or 
stability] may generate dramatically different expectations, behavior, and outcomes” (ibid. 126). They 
also identify several factors that explain variations in the levels of enforcement and stability, 
summarized in Table 3.1.    
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Table 3.1: Summary of determinants of low enforcement and low stability and their consequences, 
adapted from Levitsky and Murillo (2009)  
Low enforcement  Low stability 
Conditions Examples conditions examples 
divergence between 
political actors’ real 
and publicly stated 
goals 
ineffectual, “window-
dressing institutions” in 
order to satisfy 
international demands or 
confer domestic legitimacy 
disconnect 
between rule 
writers and 
power-holders 
precarious  
compromises between 
major actors; failure to 
incorporate 
new/powerful actors 
weak actors who 
create formal rules 
but cannot make 
them binding on all 
players 
zones of lawlessness, low 
state penetration 
rules are 
designed 
quickly 
no base of actors to 
support; no means of 
institutional 
reproduction 
disconnect between 
the actors with 
formal authority to 
make rules and 
actors who possess 
the real power 
religious, monarchic, or 
military groups exercise 
tutelary power 
institutions 
are repeatedly 
overturned or 
rendered 
ineffective 
lack of investment in 
institutions and low 
legitimacy further 
damage stability  
reformers pass 
ambitious legislation 
beyond the current 
possibility of 
implementation 
agenda-setting; increased 
bargaining power for 
future 
 
  
states with low levels 
of quasi-voluntary 
compliance 
states forced to rely on 
costly or ineffectual 
coercion 
 
  
high levels of social, 
economic or 
racial/ethnic 
inequality 
elites evade policies for 
greater equality; 
disadvantaged lack 
resources to demand it     
A more specialized approach to evaluating the strength of anti-corruption institutions 
specifically can be drawn from rational actor models. Economic theory of crime assumes that if 
government wants to combat crime, it must be able to detect it, credibly punish those responsible, and 
prevent future crime by identifying and minimizing the incentives for it. Based on this analysis, an anti-
corruption institution has to change the incentives for agents to participate or not in corrupt actions. 
The key is to convince agents that the gains from corruption are low; that if they engage in corruption, 
they are likely to be caught; and that if caught, they are likely to be punished severely. Thus, the three 
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main functions of an institution to combat corruption would be detection, punishment, and prevention, 
as depicted in Figure 3.1. Each of these duties may have effects on the others, leading to a virtuous 
circle. However, if even one of these steps fails or remains weak, the effect on corruption can be 
perverse. 
Figure 3.1: Process of combatting corruption 
 
For example, if an institution is able to detect high levels of corruption, but remains unable to effectively 
punish it, corruption may worsen. Actors responsible for corruption will remain in government and 
continue to practice it. Other actors may begin to practice corruption, as they see that there is no risk of 
punishment. A further risk is the societal effect: “exposed but unpunished political corruption will erode 
confidence in all politicians – whether corrupt or not – and perhaps even in the political system itself” 
(Power & Taylor 2011, 8). Thus, the success of an anti-corruption agency can be evaluated by their 
ability to carry out or appropriately delegate all three of these duties. 
 Some general observations can be made to draw these considerations together. One, 
institutions are rarely, if ever, designed on a blank slate by all-knowing, disinterested actors who want 
only the most efficient way to produce their stated outcome. Rather, institutional creation often draws 
from previous institutional templates and occurs in the context of competition amongst interested 
Detection 
Punishment 
Prevention 
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actors. Two, the formal rules and stated intentions of actors are not always reflected by the de facto 
functioning of the institution. Actors may also be subject to conflicting and competing interests that 
they must accommodate, including conflicting short- and long-term goals (Fritzen 2006). Three, the 
current de facto function of an institution may be different than what the original creators intended. 
And in the specific case of anti-corruption agencies, the three key functions that the institution should 
perform or effectively delegate are detection, enforcement and prevention.  
If only formal rules, efficiency and stated intentions mattered, we could assume that the CGU 
was an effective ACA because that is what its creators said it would be. Instead, it is necessary to 
evaluate how the CGU actually functions, its strengths and weaknesses, and the context in which it is 
situated. In the next section, I begin by describing the CGU, and then I evaluate how well it accomplishes 
its stated goal of combatting corruption though detection, enforcement and prevention.  
 
Evaluating the CGU 
As the flagship anti-corruption agency and premier internal control agency of the executive 
branch, the CGU has offices in every state of the union as well as a headquarters in Brasília. Its main 
organizational units currently include audit and inspection, preventing corruption, disciplinary action 
and the ombudsman’s office. The CGU employs over 2,300 functionaries and spent almost 
R$640,000,000 in 2011, almost 350 million US dollars.64 Over the more than ten years since its creation, 
the institution has seen consistent growth in budgets, prestige and jurisdiction. The CGU also enjoys 
reasonable visibility and support amongst the public, bolstered by commercials on television and public 
                                                          
64
 All of these figures on the CGU are from their official data, available at http://www.cgu.gov.br. 
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awareness campaigns. Their internet presence is also moderately high for a country where only 45% of 
the population can access the internet,65 with average page views of 246,494 per month in 2010.   
The CGU is headed by a minister chosen by presidential appointment, who is required to have 
no special qualification and may be hired and fired at will. Almost all of the CGU technical corps, both in 
the federal and state offices, has a college degree and has passed a rigorous, competitive nationwide 
qualification exam. These analysts and technicians are also highly experienced and motivated. In the 25 
interviews that I conducted with various CGU employees, I found that they generally view their jobs in 
the CGU as professions and pursue specialized qualifications accordingly.66 Many analysts have worked 
in more than one state or job function within the CGU, accruing experience in several different areas. In 
my experience, these civil servants were careful to maintain professional standards; they were especially 
concerned to safeguard against biases in their work, whether based on personal affinity or political 
sympathies. At almost no point in my observation did I see any slacking, falsification or abuse of power 
among the CGU employees I scrutinized. Rather, even facing the long hours, subpar facilities, travel 
requirements and time away from families that were required on the projects I observed, the overall 
willingness and dedication of the staff was impressive.   
So how does this organization actually perform in combatting corruption? The area in which the 
CGU has produced the most volume of output is detection. One of the most important programs in this 
area, as evidenced by the high levels of resources and publicity that the agency devotes to it, is the 
Random Audits Program, the Programa de Fiscalização a partir de Sorteios Públicos.67 This was one of 
the first initiatives announced (with great fanfare) and implemented by the agency after its creation. 
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 This data is for 2011. See World Bank Development Indicators for more information on how this figure is 
calculated: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER.P2 
66
 These claims by the CGU’s press releases and statements by its leadership were borne out through my own 
interviews with over 25 functionaries and over ten weeks of observation time with CGU analysts.   
67
 This was also the main program that I observed, accompanying audits in two different states and a total of five 
municipalities. 
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This program uses a lottery to randomly select municipalities, which are then audited on their use of 
federal funds. Carried out continuously since 2003, this program has analyzed a total of 2,084 
municipalities, or 37% of Brazilian municipalities and over 19.9 billion reais of federal resources (Leia 
mais, CGU 2013). Between 2004 and 2008, the program also included 77 random audits of federal fund 
use by states and 455 audits in state capitals and large municipalities (ibid). The program has yielded 
thousands of pages of audit reports, pointing out errors in administration as diverse as failure to 
produce planned menus for school lunch programs to outright theft of resources by the acting mayor. 
All of these reports are available to the public and the media through the CGU website. According to a 
study published in the CGU’s review, grave irregularities indicative of corruption were detected in 70% 
of the municipal governments audited (Amaral 2008, 10). Apparently, the audit programs are 
uncovering at least a portion of the corruption that exists in the system.  
However, whether there are any repercussions resulting from detection of irregularities in 
audits is unclear; the enforcement function is largely unmentioned. The CGU presents no data on how 
many of these indications of corruption were investigated or led to further outcomes.68 As far as 
prevention, there is some evidence to suggest that the audit program has no direct impact on political 
behavior and reducing corruption. One study found that in municipalities that were audited twice under 
the same administration, there was no significant difference between the rate of errors detected in the 
first and second audits in certain program areas (Leal Santana 2008, 26). Further, there appears to be no 
corruption deterrent effect produced by the municipal audit program: Ferraz and Finan (2007) find that 
second-term mayors, having seen both success and impunity, are more corrupt than 1st term mayors, 
both in terms of the quantity of resources misappropriated and the number of irregularities. 
Investigating indications of minor municipal corruption in small, isolated areas, like many errors 
revealed in CGU reports, may be quite a low priority, so it is perhaps to be expected that there are few 
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 The lack of data on the CGU’s work is even more general. The last annual report available to the public, which 
summarizes the CGU’s activities and judges their efficacy, is from 2008.  
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repercussions. Enforcement resources may be scarce and thus, not allocated to these cases of detected 
corruption. However, even when CGU investigations generate revelations of corruption that become 
front-page news, they have few to no concrete results as far as enforcement. For example, routine CGU 
work uncovered the first indications of what became the highly publicized Sanguessugas 
(“bloodsuckers”) scandal in 2006. Further investigations revealed a scheme that extended to over 100 
municipalities in at least eleven states. Eventually, 90 incumbent and 25 former members of Congress 
were accused of diverting funds from the sale of overpriced ambulances to municipal governments. 
Despite a thorough investigation and the findings of a congressional CPI that recommended the 
expulsion of 72 members, none were expelled. In addition, no one faced legal consequences in either 
electoral or federal courts (Taylor 2011, 164). 
Looking at the enforcement function more generally, according to their annual reports, from 
2003 to 2009, CGU actions resulted in 2,030 firings of government employees and 141 were further 
punished by loss of their political rights. Considering that the CGU has the ability to examine the use of 
federal resources at any level of government, municipality, state and national, this represents a 
vanishingly small percentage of probable corrupt employees. In addition, many of these administrative 
sanctions fail to “stick” due to the peculiarities of Brazil’s Labor Tribunals. Labor law is very complex, 
consisting of more than 900 articles and Constitutional provisions, which result in cases that drag on for 
years. Many workers are re-instated and/or continue to receive salaries or pensions while they exhaust 
their extensive opportunities to appeal any judgment rendered. According to The Economist, in 2009 2.1 
million Brazilians opened cases against their employers in the labor courts and these courts rarely side 
with employers (2011). 
Legal enforcement applied to corruption detected by the CGU cannot be directly carried out by 
the agency. Administrative penalties are the only direct sanctions that the CGU possesses; any criminal 
or civil proceeding must be referred to the Public Ministry for review at their own discretion. With 
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limited resources and diverse interests of their own, the agencies empowered with investigation and 
enforcement powers have little motivation to pursue each case that the CGU uncovers. In addition, 
while the CGU may investigate the wrongdoing it finds, most of the evidence needed to build a plausible 
case must be produced by the Federal Police. This dependence on the actions of other institutions leads 
to near complete impunity, even in cases where corruption is detected. According to a recent study, 
among civil servants already given administrative penalties for corruption, the chance of being 
prosecuted for corruption is less than 30%, the chance of being criminally convicted is about 3% and the 
chance of being held liable in a civil suit is less than 2% (Ribeiro de Alencar & Gico 2010). Thus, 
administrative, civil and criminal enforcement appear to be neither common nor costly, making them 
unlikely to deter actors from choosing corruption. 
While there is little evidence for success on the enforcement function, the success of the CGU in 
the area of prevention is even more difficult to gauge systematically. Most of the prevention efforts 
consist of educational and awareness-raising efforts. Some programs that the CGU carries out in this 
area include university partnerships to promote corruption studies, an annual writing competition, the 
Transparency Portal on government funding and spending, the “Child Citizen” website, training courses 
on public management for functionaries and more. However, the effects of these programs on 
preventing corruption may never be clearly attributable to the institution or may only appear after years 
of the programs. Initial information suggests that corruption has not been significantly prevented. 
Results for the goal of corruption prevention through institutional reform have been particularly weak, 
with no systemic changes accomplished. An article on September 19th, 2012 in the Correio Braziliense 
newspaper reported two sobering results of a study by the Fundação Getúlio Vargas: an estimated $7 
billion reais were wasted per year due to loss of productivity through fraud in the public sector; and over 
139 proposed anti-corruption bills were stalled in the Congress, some awaiting voting procedures for 
more than a decade.  
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The CGU, while supporting some minor legislative reforms such as an access to information law, 
has made no attempt to pursue major corruption preventative reform, especially when it would affect 
its own executive branch of government. For example, Weber Abramo (2006) argues that the major 
systemic sources of corruption, discretionary appointments and discretionary budgets, remain 
unchanged despite commonplace abuses. He points out that incoming administrations still have over 
22,000 government posts to fill at their discretion, which the executive generally trades to politicians in 
the legislature in return for their support for government programs. Further, he argues that 
discretionary budgets allow the executive branch to spend and manipulate public funds at any time in 
accordance with their own interests, “to use them to corrupt” (Weber Abramo 2006). Both of these 
sources of corruption reside in the executive branch, as does the CGU; however they remain untouched 
and unchallenged. Prevention of corruption even in its own backyard is apparently neglected. On 
balance, the CGU appears to be most successful at detection, less successful in prevention and even less 
successful in enforcement. This weakness means that the CGU has very little effect on corruption, as 
“accountability delayed is accountability denied” (Speck 2011, 143).   
 
Explanations of CGU weakness 
What explains the CGU’s weakness? Levitsky and Murillo suggest that the two key dimensions 
explaining institutional strength are stability and enforcement. From the discussion above, it appears 
that the CGU is weak due to a lack of enforcement, while accomplishing detection well. The prevention 
function is harder to judge, but no major reforms have been produced, so on balance it may be counted 
weak in the short-term. In this section, I evaluate several explanations for why the CGU is unsuccessful, 
including a lack of resources, an inhospitable institutional climate, time and institutional design. 
The first possible explanation is that the CGU lacks the necessary resources to tackle corruption. 
According to Pope, “to operate successfully, an anti-corruption agency must possess the following: 
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committed political backing at the highest levels of government; political and operational independence 
to investigate; adequate powers of access to documentation and to question witnesses; and, leadership 
which is seen as being of the highest integrity”(1999, 1). By this standard, the CGU appears to possess 
the resources to be a successful ACA. The CGU is highly placed in the government, directly reporting to 
the office of the president, with a ministerial-level chief. As discussed above, it has high quality 
personnel, most of whom are highly professional, career employees; selected based on impersonal, 
merit-based criteria; and college-educated. The CGU also enjoys generous budgets, which have tended 
to rise over time. It further has a broad mandate to deal with all matters: 
related to defending public assets and enhancing management transparency through 
internal control activities, public audits, corrective and disciplinary measures, 
corruption prevention and combat, and coordinating ombudsman's activities. As a 
central agency, CGU is also in charge of technically supervising all the departments 
making up the Internal Control System, the Disciplinary System, and the ombudsman's 
units of the Federal Executive Branch (CGU 2013). 
 
In addition, the weakness of the CGU is not uniform. We have seen that it does well at detection, 
indicating that the agency does have adequate resources to carry out at least some of the key functions 
of combatting corruption. And its programs in another area, prevention, while hard to gauge their short-
term success, are extensive and involve high amounts of financial and personnel investments. The only 
area in which the CGU is seriously, demonstrably deficient is enforcement. Thus, the evidence does not 
support the argument that the CGU is ineffective due to low resources.   
Another explanation for the failure of the CGU is that it is overly constrained by its place in the 
larger system of governance. Power and Taylor argue that in the case of corruption, “even if formal 
institutions are strong, friction between them may contribute to a weak overall institutional framework; 
as a result, even individually strong institutions – if they are embedded in a weak overall accountability 
system – may coexist with public tolerance and support for corrupt behaviors” (2011, 16). When the 
CGU was created, it added to the institutional confusion already present in Brazil’s so-called national 
integrity system. Figure 3.2 illustrates just a few of the most important parts of this system in a highly 
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simplified manner; most of these institutions have state- and municipal-level counterparts as well. 
Because this system involves so many different organs, dangers include fragmentation of duties, 
overlapping competencies and inter-institutional competition. This suggests that the CGU may be 
unsuccessful due to the restrictions imposed upon it by so many other institutions working in the same 
space. 
Figure 3.2: Major institutions of the control system organized by supervising government branch   
 
Notes: The AGU (Advocacia Geral da União) is the Office of the Attorney General; the CGU (Controladoria Geral da 
União) is the Office of the Comptroller General; theTCU (Tribunal de Contas da União) is the Federal Court of 
Accounts; CPIs (Comissões Parlimentares de Inquérito) are official Congressional investigations; and the TSE 
(Tribunal Superior de Eleições) is the Superior Electoral Court.  
 
However, this argument finds little further support.69 First, it does not account for the success of 
the CGU in detection and its actions in prevention. If the CGU was constrained by other institutions 
operating alongside it, there is no reason to expect that these institutions would allow investigations 
that could uncover dishonesty within their own organizations. In addition, there are few agencies within 
this system that would have incentives to hamstring the CGU. The Public Ministry and the Judicial 
Branch are unlikely to come into direct conflict with the CGU since they do not overlap on most 
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 As described in the preceding section, the CGU does have to rely on some of these other institutions because 
only they have the power to apply civil and criminal sanctions. But that is not an issue of organizational friction, but 
rather of design, an issue I return to later. 
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functions, as they are concerned primarily with enforcement through civil and criminal sanctions.70 In 
addition, Macaulay argues that the Public Ministry is ambivalent about combatting corruption and not 
fully independent (2011, 229). In the executive branch, the CGU is pre-eminent; the other organizations 
within this branch also report to office of the president, which coordinates their efforts to prevent 
conflict. The most likely source of institutional friction and competition inhibiting the CGU would thus be 
expected from the legislative branch.  
The most important legislative control agency is the Federal Court of Accounts or Tribunal de 
Contas da União (TCU), which shares a similar and specific primary mandate of combatting corruption 
with the CGU.71 The TCU is responsible to the legislature, older and more established.72 This could 
conceivably lead the TCU and the CGU into competition or efforts to block each other’s programs. But 
the CGU and TCU have slightly different focuses and jurisdictions. As seen above, the CGU tends to 
concentrate on corruption in states and municipalities and pursues multiple types of programs, 
including education, training, ombudsman, research, audits and inspections. In contrast, the TCU has a 
narrower mandate to audit the accounts of officials responsible for public funds or those who might 
cause loss to the public treasury.73 The bulk of TCU time and resources end up being spent on evaluating 
the post-hoc annual accounts that government agencies must report when spending federal funds, 
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 The Public Ministry, an autonomous branch made up of independent prosecutors, is charged with representing 
the public interest in the legal system and can bring cases to forward that interest; however, it must rely on the 
Federal Police to carry out investigations (Arantes 2011, 195). The Judicial Branch is concerned with applying legal 
sanctions. 
71
 The two bodies function with very different organizational models. The CGU is hierarchical and exerts internal 
control. The TCU exerts external control, and follows a collegial model, with congressionally-appointed ministers 
and auditors 
72
 Speck argues that the creation of the CGU has served to distance the TCUfrom the executive branch, as “the 
executive branch can now resort to its own audit institution to diagnose shortcomings and loopholes in the budget 
management cycle. Obviously, the executive branch is more likely to prefer the CGU’s recommendations to those 
of a body like the TCU that answers to Congress” (2011, 146). 
73
 See their website for more information: http://portal2.tcu.gov.br/portal/page/portal/TCU/english/inside. 
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leaving them little time for elective outside investigations.74 The two agencies are thus unlikely to come 
into conflict over whose purview a certain case is. 
In contrast to providing a source of institutional friction, the CGU and TCU have successfully 
cooperated on many past operations. Two examples include providing joint oversight of the Pan-
American Games and investigating the Sanguessugas scheme described above. Based on information 
from my interviews with multiple CGU analysts and administrators involved in these two projects, inter-
agency collaborations are generally successful and do not involve conflicts of interest, due to the high 
level of impartiality and professionalism of the functional corps. My respondents stated that CGU and 
TCU provide complementary expertise when working together, since they have differing strengths: the 
CGU has more motivated, trained personnel, while the TCU has a larger organizational structure and 
subsequently more financial resources.  
As lack of resources and an inhospitable institutional environment do not appear to explain the 
CGU’s limited success, another possibility is that the CGU has just not had sufficient time to successfully 
impact corruption. Corruption is a large problem in Brazil; the CGU was only founded in 2001, though it 
has remained stable ever since according to Levitsky and Murillo’s criteria.75 It could be the case that 
well-designed, good-faith, ambitious efforts at combatting corruption simply take long periods of time 
to have any effect. Even small results might not be detectable for years. However, by looking at other 
countries’ experience, it becomes evident that this is not always the case. In fact, some ACAs have been 
remarkably quick to produce results, even in initially hostile environments.  
There are several examples of successful ACAs that offer different institutional models. For 
example, Singapore is now the least corrupt country in Asia, despite initial challenges, due to the efforts 
of its successful ACA. Though a poor country with widespread civil service corruption inherited from 
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 This is according to interviews with TCU auditors, academics and anti-corruption NGO workers. 
75
 This will be discussed more in depth below. 
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British colonial rule and Japanese occupation, it managed to implement an anti-corruption body in 1960 
that rapidly diminished corruption throughout government, through attacking both incentives and 
opportunities (Quah 1999, 490-491). Another example, Hong Kong’s anti-corruption agency, the 
Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), is considered one of the most successful in the 
world. It has maintained that success for over 30 years despite the 1997 transfer from governance by 
the United Kingdom into Chinese hands. In 1974, systemic corruption was found throughout Hong 
Kong’s government and business sectors, including significantly, the police and the justice system (de 
Speville 2010, 63). Yet it took only a few months to found the ICAC and by three years after its creation it 
had “been able to ‘break the back’ of syndicated corruption; by July 1977 ‘no major corruption 
syndicates were known to exist at that time’”(ibid., 64). The Hong Kong model was exported to several 
other countries76 plagued by deep-rooted corruption with noted success. Botswana adopted the model 
in 1994; it is now the least corrupt country in Africa and among the top 25% of countries worldwide 
(ibid., 48). 77 
These cases illustrate that the lack of quasi-voluntary compliance alone – a “culture of 
corruption” – does not necessarily doom institutions to weak enforcement, as Levitsky and Murillo 
suggest. In fact, the Hong Kong model suggests that CGU’s lack of success may lie in its institutional 
design. The ICAC is an independent body with three main attributions: prevention, education and 
enforcement. It carries out investigations, but these investigations must be triggered by a complaint. 
Like the CGU, the ICAC addresses the main actions necessary to combat corruption: detection 
(investigation), prevention (through reforms and education) and enforcement. However, unlike the 
CGU, the ICAC is autonomous and possesses the ability for credible, costly enforcement.  
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 Some of those countries include Madagascar, Benin, Ethiopia, India, Kenya, Malawi, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan and 
Sierra Leone.  
77
 This is according the Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. 
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Looking more generally, the common element that successful ACAs share that has not been 
instituted in the case of the CGU is an ability to apply meaningful sanctions against corrupt behavior. In 
the case of Hong Kong, this usually is accomplished through a quasi-judicial function within the ACA that 
has the power to determine punishments which are then carried out by law enforcement mechanisms. 
These courts have the ability to order financial restitutions, apply institutional sanctions, authorize 
search and seizure, arrest and grant bail, and dismiss corrupt officials. Other countries that successfully 
follow such a model include Lithuania and Latvia. The CGU does not possess these abilities, which are 
delegated to law enforcement bodies, weakening its ability to make a credible contribution to deterring 
corruption. The CGU must rely on the Public Ministry and the Federal Police for all such actions – thus 
the power is divided from the responsibility, weakening accountability. 
 Of the other possible reasons for low enforcement suggested by Levitsky and Murillo (2009) the 
most compelling in this case is the divergence between political actors’ real and publicly-stated goals. As 
the discussion below explains, the creators and reformers of the CGU, presidents, were not weak actors 
who lacked the capacity to make formal rules binding on all players. Brazilian presidents have high levels 
of budgetary discretion and are free to create and abolish executive departments. Several different 
Brazilian presidents managed to create and change anti-corruption institutions. There also was not a 
significant disconnect between rule-writers and power-holders; as described above, the CGU actually 
has quite high resources and bureaucratic capacity, accomplishing its detection function in a variety of 
settings. Rather, I argue that actors’ publicly stated goal of combatting corruption was not always 
congruent with their real goals – or at least not completely. When subjected to competing interests and 
pressure to act on corruption, politicians designed and perpetuated anti-corruption agencies that were 
fundamentally flawed through their dependence and lack of strong enforcement. The following section 
outlines the evidence through an analysis of events.  
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Making the CGU 
In this section, I examine the institutional design and evolution of the CGU. First I discuss the 
underlying conditions and pre-existing institutional models. Then I look at several critical moments in 
the development of the CGU, including its creation and various structural reorganizations. I argue that 
each event was part of an established strategy by the executive, beginning under Franco’s presidency, 
for deflecting criticism on the issue of corruption. When faced with congressional investigations and/or 
public mobilization around corruption that threatened his political interests, the president reacted by 
“reforming” the CGU, especially if he was also under electoral pressures. In doing so, he drew from an 
existing institutional template for a certain type of anti-corruption agency, one that was controlled by 
the presidency and that had no reliable enforcement mechanism. This strategy was successful in so far 
as it helped resolve crises by generating positive publicity on how the administration was combatting 
corruption, while actually leading to no real effects on corruption. In Levitsky and Murillo’s terminology, 
the actors’ real and publicly-stated goals diverged, leading to a weak institution.     
 
Underlying conditions and antecedents  
Historically, corruption has been endemic to Brazil. Key thinkers on Brazilian society and culture 
as diverse as Gilberto Freyre, Sérgio Buarque de Holanda, Raimundo Faoro, Darcy Ribeiro and Roberto 
DaMatta trace the problem of corruption to the period of Portuguese colonization and see it as virtually 
encoded in society’s DNA.78 Many of these authors examine “malandragem”, which is a term often used 
in an admiring manner for the practice of using ingenious and subtle tricks to take advantage of a 
situation, often in an illicit fashion. Another powerful part of both popular and academic discourse is the 
“jeitinho brasileiro”, a particularly Brazilian phrase describing actions taken to facilitate favorable 
outcomes through particularistic measures which at times may become corruption (DaMatta 1984, 95-
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 For details, see their respective works: The Masters and the Slaves, Roots of Brazil, The Owners of Power, The 
Brazilian People, and A casa e a rua. 
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105).79 Institutions with formal rules have thus long been situated in a climate of significant, systemic 
corruption and informality, existing “para inglês ver”.  
After a long period of bureaucratic-authoritarian rule, the Constitution of 1988 established 
Brazil’s current democracy as a federal structure with significant decentralization. The municipalities, 
the basic unit of governance, receive on average 65% of their budgets through transfers from the 
federal government (Brollo & Nanninnici 2011, 14). These transfers are accompanied by relatively little 
oversight and the principal-agent problem tends to breed more corruption among local governments. 
The Constitution does include some discussion of accountability in public administration, dividing the 
spheres into external – i.e. outside of the executive -- control (epitomized by Legislative oversight and 
the TCU) and internal control (now epitomized by the CGU). In addition, there is also mention of social 
control, which is exercised by citizens over their government. When these changes were introduced, 
they helped move corruption into the realm of public administration problems instead of just being a 
criminal issue (or no issue at all due to the laws of immunity protecting many public figures from 
prosecution), as it had been under the military regime.   
The first major corruption episode that the new democracy faced erupted in 1991, as outlined in 
work by Geddes and Ribeiro Neto (1992, 1999). President Fernando Collor de Mello, the first popularly 
elected president of Brazil since 1961, had built his successful campaign on the promise to go after the 
privileged and corrupt, as a “caçador de Marajás”.80 By the first half of his term, revelations surfaced 
about an extensive scheme of influence-buying, auctioning of political appointments, bribery and false 
bank accounts that had begun during his campaign and continued throughout his mandate. After 
repeated media reports and public outcry, the National Congress could ignore the issue no longer and in 
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 According to public opinion research, 63% of Brazilians admitted to taking a jeitinho (Almeida 2007, 49). 
80
 Literally, this means “maharaja hunter”. “Maharaja” was the word that Collor’s campaign used for public 
functionaries that received high, unearned and disproportionate salaries. An interview with Collor, where he 
explains the origin of the phrase, is available here: http://mais.uol.com.br/view/1575mnadmj5c/1989-collor-
conta-origem-da-expressao-cacador-de-marajas-0402346ADCA17366?types=A&. 
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1992, they installed a Comissão Parlamentar de Inquérito (CPI) to investigate (Fleischer 1997, 299). To 
the surprise of many politicians who believed that it would come to nothing, the immediate 
recommendation was impeachment. Although the president attempted to have the impeachment 
debate as a secret session, 441 of 503 legislators voted for impeachment in open congress. Collor left 
office in disgrace. 
The institutional reaction to the corruption scandal and its fallout did not come until two years 
later. As a reaction to the Collor episode and the so-called “budget-dwarves” scandal,81 in 1994 the 
Federal Secretary of Internal Control was created within the Finance Ministry along with a Special 
Investigation Committee (CEI) made up of representatives of civil society. This strategy was based on the 
outcome of the budget CPI and the Collor CPI, along with recommendations from the TCU, and became 
law through executive order of President Itamar Franco, who had assumed the presidency upon Collor’s 
exit (Fleischer 1997). Debate within the administration over the creation of this institution was fierce; it 
was widely seen to have been former vice-president Franco’s attempt to make amends (ibid.). The office 
of the secretary was intended to strengthen internal control through oversight and auditing mechanisms 
within the federal government. Perhaps due to its location under the aegis of the presidency or perhaps 
because it was considered a usurpation of Congress’s traditional prerogative, the legislature showed no 
interest in passing the necessary law to maintain the Secretary of Internal Control. The executive order 
guaranteeing its existence had to be reissued 87 times between 1994 and 2001, when the office ceased 
to exist (Amaral 2008, 15).   
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 In this scheme, lawmakers received fat commissions from big businessman in exchange for passing legislation 
that created large, publicly-funded works projects. They also made amendments to other bills that allocated 
money to supposed philanthropic organizations which were actually linked to their relatives and other frontmen. 
The scandal and resulting investigation eventually lead to the removal of the president of the Câmara dos 
Deputados (the lower house of the national legislature), the leader of the PMDB political party and one other 
congressman. 
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Origin 
In 1996, Fernando Henrique Cardoso won the presidency, mostly based on the popularity he 
accrued from taming hyperinflation. One of his first acts was to decree the end of the Special 
Investigation Committee on corruption created under Franco, though many important cases were still 
left to investigate. Among these upcoming cases were several banks and construction companies that 
had been Cardoso’s biggest campaign donors (Fleischer 1999, 317). The duties of the CEI reverted to the 
Federal Secretary of Internal Control, which did not possess its special investigatory powers, and no 
significant outcome was attained. In his first term in office, Cardoso did not make combatting corruption 
a focus, though his administration and allies were dogged by an average number of scandals, including 
the privatization scandal (1997), the re-election vote-buying scheme (1997), the Cayman dossier (1998), 
diversion of funds in the construction of the São Paulo Regional Employment Court (1999) and the 
Sudam revelations (2001). Cardoso vigorously maintained his own innocence in each of these cases; he 
was quoted as saying “I can state comfortably that there is no corruption in this government. When we 
know about it we act straightforwardly”.82  
Over time, the vote-buying scandal became one of the most serious threats to the Cardoso 
administration. The controversy began in 1997 with the campaign by the presidency to amend the 
constitution to allow re-election to executive offices. Shortly after this measure was approved by the 
lower house of the legislature, the Câmara dos Deputados, and awaiting approval by the Senate, the 
newspaper Folha de São Paulo revealed a recording of two congressman admitting to having taken 
200,000 reais to vote in favor of the amendment.83 The scheme was alleged to have involved at least 
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 According to Veja magazine, Cardoso said that the authors of the dossier, which accused him and others of being 
the beneficiaries of an off shore account worth $368 million, “[they] are buffoons, forgers and people that Brazil 
worked hard to expel from public life”. See Rede de Escândalos for more information: 
http://veja.abril.com.br/infograficos/rede-escandalos/.  
83
 The news appeared in the Folha de São Paulo on May 13-14, 1997. See 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fol/pol/po14051.htm. 
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five more deputies, including the head of the lower house, and two state governors. The coordinator 
was reportedly the Minister of Communication, a personal friend and chief advisor to the president. The 
day after the news was released, the house created an investigatory commission. Immediately, 
Cardoso’s government reacted by doling out public appointments and liberating resources. According to 
Lucio Vaz writing in the Folha de São Paulo, over 47 million reais were liberated in one week, with 
almost two million of that amount going to the home districts of four deputies who removed their 
names from the petition for an investigative committee. One senator, Maguito Vilela, accused the 
Cardoso government of using any means to stifle various CPIs on corruption and said that he received 
offers of money in exchange for retiring his support of these investigations.  
The scandal continued to gain steam even through Cardoso’s re-election campaign in 1998. The 
Cayman dossier episode, which was never fully investigated, added fuel to the fire. Then in 2000, as part 
of political jockeying to preserve his own power, the president of the Senate, Antônio Carlos Magalhães, 
began to publicize revelations of government corruption. Soon, the Cardoso government was labeled by 
congressional critics, the media and public opinion as ineffective and unwilling to combat corruption. 
According to IBOPE opinion polls, presidential approval ratings were low and disapproval was much 
higher after 1998, never again achieving previous average levels.84 Amid calls for impeachment, 
Congress began proceedings to install a CPI to investigate 16 cases of alleged corruption, including vote-
buying and other schemes that could incriminate Cardoso’s immediate associates and perhaps even the 
president himself. At first, it appeared that there was significant and sufficient support for a Corruption 
CPI in both houses. However, after much behind-the-scenes maneuvering and a temporary closure of 
the legislature, significant pressure from the administration won out and the measure failed.85  
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 Survey results reported in Veja (http://veja.abril.com.br/040401/p_040.html). IBOPE is the largest public opinion 
polling firm in Latin America. 
85
 See “Como FHC enterrou a CPI da Corrupção” by journalist Bernardo Kucinski in Carta Maior for one summary of 
these events: http://www.cartamaior.com.br/templates/colunaMostrar.cfm?coluna_id=3360. 
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Cardoso’s government escaped the immediate danger of impeachment and CPIs, but elections 
were only a year away and the President’s party was far from holding a comfortable lead. In order to 
repair its image as soft on corruption and preserve its chances of election, some measure was necessary. 
The strategy that the administration pursued was similar to that of Itamar Franco: creation of a new 
internal control institution with the mandate to combat corruption in the federal government. Through 
a medida provisória (n° 2.143-31), a direct act of the president that carries the force of law without the 
participation of the legislature, Cardoso established the Corregedoria-Geral da União. The stated goal of 
this agency, which focused on internal control and was directly responsible to the executive, was to 
combat fraud and corruption and to protect public patrimony. This followed generally along the lines of 
the model provided by Franco’s Federal Secretary of Internal Control created. Cardoso’s official speech 
announcing the creation of the Corregedoria actually contained very little content on the concrete role 
or goals of the future institution. Roughly eighty percent of his discourse dealt extensively with two 
political topics: Cardoso’s innocence from involvement in corruption scandals and the wrongness of a 
Corruption CPI.86   
 
Evolution 
On balance, the creation of the Corregedoria was generally judged to be a direct result of 
pressures on the Cardoso administration both from public opinion and political opponents (Braga 2008, 
44). The most radical opponents of the administration alleged from the beginning that the institution 
was an “órgão de fachada”, a façade agency, created only to deflect criticisms generated by the 
                                                          
86
 The speech, “Pronunciamento da criação da Corregedoria Geral da União”, was delivered on April 2, 2001. The 
text is available at http://www.biblioteca.presidencia.gov.br/ex-presidentes/fernando-henrique-
cardoso/discursos-1/2o-mandato/2001-1o-semestre/28.pdf. 
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Corruption CPI affair. 87 There is some circumstantial evidence for this interpretation.88 Conveniently, 
Cardoso would be leaving office in 2002, so the newly formed Corregedoria would have little time to 
evaluate his own administration. All the political capital of the anti-corruption initiative could thus 
accrue to Cardoso, and by extension to his party’s presidential candidate, with little risk of sanctions on 
his own behavior. However, since the Corregedoria was designed to be a permanent, standing agency of 
the executive branch, it would be expected to continue functioning under Cardoso’s successor. Thus, 
Cardoso established an anti-corruption body with the purview of revealing corruption, including 
corruption in the presidency, which might constrain the behavior of future administrations. Cardoso in 
fact did attempt to constrain the behavior of his possible successors in another arena: he extracted a 
promise from each presidential candidate to abide by the IMF’s conditions and follow the general 
economic policy of his own administration.89    
As early as 2001, it already appeared that Luis Inácio “Lula” da Silva of the opposition Worker’s 
Party (PT) was a frontrunner for the presidency, with the candidate from Cardoso’s own Brazilian Social 
Democracy Party (PSDB), José Serra, in a fairly distant third place.90 Demonized by conservatives within 
Brazil and doubted by the international press and markets, Lula was painted by his opponents as an 
irresponsible socialist who would undo the important policies of the Cardoso years.91 In 2002, as the 
electoral competition between Lula and Serra, heated up, the Federal Secretary of Internal Control and 
                                                          
87
 Several blogs by political figures advance this argument, as well as more radical interpretations. See for example, 
http://www.consciencia.net/brasil/03/cardoso.html and http://saraiva13.blogspot.com/2013/06/escandalos-de-
corrupcao-de-fhc.html. Interviewees within the CGU also mentioned this criticism as one that they had commonly 
faced. 
88
 It is not possible to come to a definite conclusion on this point, as it would assume too much knowledge of the 
actors’ interests than the data can actually provide. 
89
 For one account of Cardoso’s ambitions, see the report by The Economist from August 17, 2002 titled Brazil and 
the IMF: A matter of faith, available at www.economist.com/node/1284003. 
90
 See several IBOPE/CNI and TSE polls reported in the April 4, 2001 edition of Veja magazine. 
91
 Several article titles from the Economist give a sense of the international reaction: Who’s afraid of Lula?; The 685 
billion reais question; and the Beauty and the Beast. 
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another agency were folded into the Corregedoria, which also took on the role of general ombudsman 
from the Justice Ministry. This may have sent a further signal to the electorate of the commitment of the 
PSDB to combatting corruption. It may also have served to further strengthen the Corregedoria, which 
could reap benefits for the administration regardless of the results of the election.   
Lula’s campaign was based partially on the PT’s image as “clean” and anti-corruption. The PT 
had originally been founded by opponents of the military regime, including labor leaders, leftist 
intellectuals and progressive Catholics, who organized around issues of social justice (Keck 1986, 68). In 
contrast to most Brazilian parties, the PT was organized from the bottom up and began by emphasizing 
democracy and openness in its own internal structure (Samuels 2006). The party built a domestic 
following and a reputation for clean management over more than a decade and a half of subnational 
governance. One focus of PT administration, the city government of Porto Alegre in Rio Grande do Sul 
from 1989 to 2005, even achieved worldwide renown for the quality and probity of its governance. 
Despite moderation on several other aspects of PT ideology,92 including swapping a socialist outlook for 
a more pragmatic economic policy, Lula’s campaign stayed true to the anti-corruption message. 
Transparency International reported that alone among the candidates, Lula signed an eight measure 
anti-corruption pledge outlined by Transparência Brasil.93 His official platform mentioned corruption 
explicitly several times; in one section, it reads: 
Corruption continues corroding public resources. Our government will not promise 
magical responses. But it can promise an ethical orientation and a tireless fight for the 
country’s advancement (Partido dos Trabalhadores 2002, 16).  
 
The election was close and hard fought, eventually pitting Lula against Serra in the second 
round, which ended in a final vote share of 61% for Lula. On January 1, 2003, Lula assumed the 
                                                          
92
 After three previous unsuccessful bids for the presidency, Lula’s image in this campaign was much less radical. 
This approach came to be labelled “Lula Light” and “Lula Peace and Love”. 
93
 The signing occurred on September 25, 2002. The news reslease is available at 
http://archive.transparency.org/news_room/latest_news/press_releases/2002/2002_09_27_da_silva_brazil. 
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presidency, a first for his party. The administration faced multiple challenges to governing, including 
inexperience, a relatively small legislative presence and maintaining public support – all while pursuing 
an ambitious program of reforms. Lula was expected to remain true to his PT roots and please its old 
supporters while pursuing a program that would not alienate new supporters or potential allies. 
Combatting corruption was a ready-made issue that both groups could agree upon; it would help Lula 
hold together his electoral coalition of PT base and moderate voters.  
It was clear that Lula had to at least appear to address corruption in order to fulfill campaign 
promises and respond to public pressure for change. His administration needed a fast strategy to 
address this necessity. Again, despite the lack of success in reducing corruption produced by the 
preceding organizations, these existing models again molded the choice of institutional design, which 
suggests a certain degree of path dependence. Following in the footsteps of the Franco and Cardoso 
governments, Lula’s government focused on the Corregedoria, an internal control body responsible to 
the executive. On the first day of his mandate, Lula issued the medida provisória n° 103, a presidential 
decree with the force of law, which established transformed the old Corregedoria into the Controladoria 
Geral da União (CGU).  
The CGU would be a ministerial-level office headed by the State Minister for Control and 
Transparency, and reporting directly to the president. Its organization gained several attributions, and 
its stated goals were  
defending public assets and enhancing management transparency through internal 
control activities, public audits, corrective and disciplinary measures, corruption 
prevention and combat, and coordinating ombudsman's activities (CGU 2003). 
 
However, despite this rhetoric, the PT’s reputation as hard on corruption and Lula’s repeated promises 
to change the system, like the Corregedoria, the CGU had weak enforcement mechanisms. The CGU was 
only allowed administrative sanctions and remained beholden to other organizations for any other 
enforcement, unlike the Hong Kong model which has been successful through possessing independent 
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means of criminal sanction. CGU did not gain any independence or autonomy, either. Lula appointed 
Waldir Pires, a career politician and former governor, deputy and federal minister, as the agency’s first 
head. One of the first programs inaugurated by the reformed organization was the Programa de 
Fiscalização a partir de Sorteios Públicos (Random Audits Program), which chose states and 
municipalities by lottery for audits on their use of federal resources, as discussed earlier. This was to 
become one of their flagship programs in the area of detection.  
Despite competition from other agenda items in the first days of Lula’s administration, there 
was ample publicity devoted to this “new” anti-corruption agency. Lula discussed it fairly extensively in 
his first address to the National Congress, as well as in other speeches.94 It is discussed in his first 
message to the Congress, which contained his legislative agenda. The public relations department of the 
CGU and the Presidency spent considerable resources to advertise the reformed agency, sponsoring 
interviews, ceremonies and press releases. Media coverage was extensive as well, with stories appearing 
in all the major outlets. These actions served as signals to the public about Lula’s commitment to 
combatting corruption and fidelity to his campaign promises, although no actual output had yet been 
produced.  
The CGU from 2003 to 2006 acted generally as described in the beginning section of the article: 
it was generally good at detection, invested in some prevention measures, though not systemic reform, 
and showed little enforcement success. Despite the election of an executive seen as committed to 
eradicating corruption, this pattern continued undisturbed through 2006, which brought the next 
episode of institutional change under the shadow of the mensalão scandal and approaching presidential 
elections. The scandal began in 2005, when Federal Deputy Roberto Jefferson was under investigation 
for his role in a corruption scheme in the postal service (escândalo dos correios). In a June 6th interview 
with the Folha de São Paulo, Jefferson stated that the Lula administration had paid federal legislators for 
                                                          
94
 Archives of presidential communications and speeches are available through the Library of the Presidency: 
http://www.biblioteca.presidencia.gov.br/ex-presidentes/luiz-inacio-lula-da-silva. 
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votes. Ultimately, it was revealed that the PT had mounted a grand scheme whereby members of the 
Câmara dos Deputados received monthly payments of about 30,000 reais (a big monthly allowance or 
“mensalão”) to vote in approval of presidential projects. The scheme was financed with public funds and 
functioned under the direction of the Minister of the Presidency and top Lula strategist, José Dirceu. 
This scandal was heavily reported in the media, with 21 magazine covers in Veja alone (Scandal Web). 
Eventually accusations surfaced that implicated the national president of the PT, the previous PT 
national president, the PT treasurer, the president of the Câmara dos Deputados, the PT leader in the 
Câmara, the Finance Minister and many others close to the PT and the Lula administration.  
Lula responded to the scandal with a message to the Brazilian people 91 days after the news 
broke: 
I want to tell you, with all frankness, I feel betrayed. Betrayed by unacceptable practices 
about which I never had knowledge. I am indignant about the revelations appearing 
every day, shocking the country. The PT was created exactly to strengthen ethics in 
politics (Veja Scandal Web).95 
 
Developments continued to surface, keeping the scandal in the public eye for a prolonged period 
through 2005 and 2006. Some of those accused of involvement in the mensalão, including the political 
strategist Duda Mendonça, attempted to lay the scheme at Lula’s feet. Under a barrage of evidence, 
public opinion turned against Lula and his government. In the edition of July 13th, Veja reported that the 
scandal was eroding the president’s image; an Ipsos opinion poll found that 55% of Brazilian believed 
that Lula knew about the corruption in his government. Lula’s approval ratings fell to their lowest point 
in late 2005,96 as a mensalão CPI established in Congress recommended the expulsion of 18 deputies for 
corruption. The negative effects of the scandal were compounded by revelations about PT use of “caixa 
dois” campaign financing, a common practice across political parties in Brazil of unreported campaign 
                                                          
95
 Author’s translation. Original speech was made on August 12, 2005 and available through O Estado de São Paulo 
Online. 
96
 In addition, disapproval of Lula was nearly equal to approval, at around 30%, in this period. See polls from 
CNT/Sensus at www.sensus.com.br.  
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contributions and expenses. Lula famously stated in an interview on the TV show Fantástico that what 
the PT did (i.e. use of caixa dois) was from an electoral standpoint exactly the same as what is done 
systematically in Brazil and that the PT was no different from other parties.97  
With Lula’s approval ratings slipping and various attacks from opposition legislators through the 
mensalão CPI, his chances for re-election were also declining. The Folha de São Paulo reported that 
Datafolha polls of vote intentions in late 2005 showed a slight drop in possible Lula votes, with the result 
that the president was now unlikely to win outright in the first round of the elections.98 In light of 
popular disapproval, legislative opposition investigation efforts and the pressures of election year 
politics, the administration decided again to address corruption by pursuing the same strategy as in the 
past. In January of 2006, the presidency announced the changes to the CGU contained in the decree n° 
5.683, which restructured the agency again. The Secretary for the Prevention of Corruption and 
Strategic Information was created at this time. Instead of increasing the ability of the CGU to punish 
corruption, this reform merely reinforced the prevention duty of the CGU in combatting corruption, 
especially through research on how it may be prevented and what conditions give rise to it.  
Similar to previous episodes under Franco and Cardoso, the motive for this institutional change 
was a political crisis and election pressures. Drawing attention to the CGU through administrative 
changes could diffuse the scandal around Lula, the PT and the mensalão investigations by showing that 
the government was acting on the problem. This goal became even more crucial as the 2006 elections 
loomed nearer, and the PT’s former promises of clean government began to sound hollow on the 
campaign trail. By strengthening the CGU, though only in the area of prevention, Lula could get the 
                                                          
97
 This interview was aired on July 17, 2005 on the TV Globo network’s popular newsmagazine, Fantástico, during 
primetime. 
98
 In later research on the election of 2006, Lucio Rennó indeed finds that corruption was important to many 
voters. He argues that it was the decisive factor that led to Lula’s failure to dominate in the first round of elections. 
While Lula was eventually re-elected, Rennó describes how voters used their first round votes as “protest votes” or 
to punish Lula, before returning to the fold in round two (2011).  
 
 
117 
 
kudos for attacking corruption without letting the process get too out of hand and steal the thunder of 
anti-corruption efforts pursued by the legislative branch. In addition, expanding the CGU signaled Lula’s 
own aloofness and uninvolvement from the scandal, making it seem like the corrupt practices were 
confined among a small cadre of bad apples. This effort apparently saw some success; voters, at least 
among certain demographics, retained more support for Lula than for the PT and saw the president as 
above the corruption scandals (Hunter & Power 2007; Samuels 2008; Rennó 2011). Ultimately, Lula 
survived the scandals and was re-elected to a second term, although the election was close enough to 
necessitate a second round runoff.  
 
Discussion 
On balance, throughout this period, the CGU generally retained its essential design, as an 
internal control body with the stated goal of combatting corruption reporting to the office of the 
presidency. Even under different presidents with apparently different interests, the CGU continued to 
persist and produce the same outcomes. Despite the appearance of substantive reforms, promised in 
the stated goals of actors, what occurred were a series of actions that increased responsibility and/or 
resources available for detection without addressing the fundamental lack of enforcement and weak 
prevention function. These actions generated positive publicity and deflected demands for investigation, 
effectively diffusing both horizontal and vertical accountability mechanisms, without actually making the 
CGU any more successful in combatting corruption. At no time did any reform take place that increased 
enforcement powers, nor were any substantial systemic reforms pursued. Table 3.2 summarizes the 
major events discussed, the surrounding conditions and their immediate outcomes. 
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As the timeline above illustrates clearly, the CGU has existed for over a dozen years and retained 
most of the same goals, procedures and structure. Yet corruption has persisted and perhaps even 
worsened, so the continued reproduction of the same institutional model initially makes little sense. By 
Levitsky and Murillo’s criteria, the CGU is indeed a stable, but weak institution. One part of the 
explanation for this result is the reproduction of an institutional template provided by earlier 
institutions. As described in the event analysis, the CGU, even through periods of reforms, has remained 
an investigatory body with low powers of enforcement directly responsible to the presidency, just as the 
Corregedoria Geral da União was. Another part of the explanation is path dependence: once created, 
institutions can be sticky, preventing attempts at reform. Even when a new political actor, Lula, entered 
power, he did little to substantially strengthen the CGU, and it continued on much as before. While any 
president wishing to institute more serious judicial reforms or refinements to the CGU that would have 
enhanced its ability to sanction corrupt behavior could have pursued such measures with some hope of 
success, such reforms were never seriously considered.  
However, the initial choice of the institutional form of the CGU and its maintenance cannot be 
explained solely by templates and path dependence. It is necessary to look further at the interests and 
goals of the actors involved in order to understand why a weak institution was created and reproduced. 
This is a delicate process since it would be inappropriate to just read actors’ intentions solely from the 
outcomes that the institutions that they create produce. Likewise, it is not always possible to trust 
actors’ stated intentions in the creation of institutions. Any analysis of this kind must walk a fine line 
between these two presumptions (Brinkerhoff 2000, 241). However, it is appropriate to address the 
question, as the role of the actors is clearly important to explaining the CGU’s existence. 
Actors in government may really want to combat corruption, but they must balance this goal 
against their other priorities. These mixed intentions can result in an institution that has some strong 
features and has the appearance of a credible effort, but that is weak or ineffectual. The stated of 
 
 
120 
 
intention of the CGU creators and the organization itself, has always been to combat corruption, but the 
institution is unsuccessful in fact. The creation and maintenance of the CGU thus can be seen as an 
attempt by the presidency to combat corruption, but in a way that minimized the risks to the executive 
and maximized his benefits. The actors’ attempts to safeguard their interests resulted in an institution 
that did not accomplish the stated goal because it did not provide credible, disinterested enforcement 
mechanisms.  
By its chosen institutional design, the CGU is a creature of the executive. In maintaining control 
over the institution though budgetary and appointment power, the presidency can influence its agenda 
and outlook, minimizing risk. As we saw in the description of CGU programs, most of their activities take 
place on the municipal and state levels, far from Brasília and avoiding more powerful, national political 
figures. In addition, the institutional design of the CGU further protects the presidency by weakening 
enforcement possibilities. Even if, against the interests of the presidency, the CGU were to investigate 
corruption within the executive, without investment from other branches of the state, the Public 
Ministry or judicial system, it could bring no credible punishment. Unlike in the more successful versions 
of the Hong Kong model which possess the ability to impose criminal sanctions and greater investigative 
powers, the CGU can only exercise administrative penalties; all civil and criminal penalties must be 
brought by other government bodies, assuming that the figures involved do not enjoy immunity from 
prosecution, as many office-holders do. Other agencies have their own agendas, scarce resources and 
reasons not to antagonize the executive. As we saw in the first section of the paper, the ultimate result 
is that serious enforcement rarely occurs, which insulates the executive but also weakens the CGU. 
The CGU’s design also maximizes benefits to the executive. First, the creation and maintenance 
of the CGU provides a lasting institution that may be activated in the future in order to constrain the 
activities of opposition governments in power. Secondly, as seen by the discussion above, the CGU has 
been used to protect against actions by other branches, especially the legislature, to hold the executive 
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and its allies accountable. This occurred under both Lula and Cardoso. The creation and periodic reform 
of the institution also has deflected criticism of the executive for “doing nothing about corruption”. 
Reisman describes this tactic for coping with anti-corruption demands as follows: “the legislative 
response of the elite will have engorged symbolic components but stunted limbs: inadequate 
enforcement machinery, no procedures for staffing, insufficient budget, the appointment of manifest 
incompetents (who also have a very special value in political systems), and so on” (1979, 105; emphasis 
added). He goes on to say that “enforcement techniques must be symbolic, highly public, and appear to 
have dramatic results” (ibid). Thus, reforming the CGU (even without actually making it more effective) 
provides the appearance of combatting corruption and generates public support for the executive, 
which is particularly useful under electoral pressures. The strategy was first utilized by President Franco 
when he created the Federal Secretary of Internal Control to deal with fallout from corruption 
investigations and later emulated by both Cardoso and Lula.  
In sum, the outcome of calculations by the executive produces an institution which empowers 
investigation, but offers the possibility of administrative sanctions as the CGU’s only “stick”. The design 
leaves all significant enforcement functions (civil damages, criminal proceedings) delegated to the 
discretion of other institutions, which have their own incentives to ignore these demands. In addition, 
the CGU remains at least partially subject to executive control, making it less likely to pursue corruption 
prevention through systemic reforms or investigate the executive. For the actors in power, actually 
effectively combatting corruption is costly and dangerous. The appearance of doing so may be worth 
more than actually doing so. And given the fact that the CGU is inserted into the complex web of 
accountability institutions, one of several cogs in a larger machine, it is easy for presidents explain away 
the lack of performance of the agency and minimize any personal responsibility. 
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Conclusion 
In this article, I examined the role of an anti-corruption agency, the CGU, in the case of Brazil. I 
first evaluated how well the institution performs the three major activities necessary to combat 
corruption. I concluded that the CGU performs detection well, but is less successful on punishment and 
prevention,99 leading to an overall failure in effectiveness. I then explored various explanations for the 
CGU’s failure to produce results. I argue that the most compelling explanation is that the CGU’s 
institutional design is most responsible, as it possesses only a weak ability to punish corruption. I then 
examined the history of the CGU and the conditions under which it was formed and reformed. I find that 
the creation and reforms to the CGU were used to deflect (or prevent in the case of the 2003 reform) 
popular criticism and Congressional attempts to hold the executive and its allies accountable. Despite 
reforms, I find that the CGU remained more or less effectively the same throughout this period, showing 
surprising stability despite its failure to achieve its stated goal and the changing constellations of 
interests and power. I then elaborated on some of the pressures that may cause politicians to prefer an 
institution that is dependent and toothless, especially with respect to enforcement. In this section, I 
expand on these themes and suggest further implications of these findings.  
Throughout the world, any political actor who is out of power may be serious about combatting 
corruption in the administration, but once in power, he sees that this weapon can be easily turned 
against him. In the case of the Brazil, this has resulted in the proliferation of anti-corruption bodies, as 
actors react to arm themselves against other anti-corruption campaigns. Thus, legislative branch is 
willing to investigate corruption in the executive, as seen from their use of CPIs,100 but hesitant to 
                                                          
99
 As I explained previously, prevention has not been forwarded by the CGU in a systematic way, either through 
major legislation or bureaucratic re-organization. The results of its educational programs on future prevention are 
harder to judge and may not become evident for many years. 
100
 The TCU is older and has more resources than the CGU, but it is even more vulnerable to political influence. It is 
linked to the legislature and staffed by former politicians, considered a cushy early retirement given as a reward 
for party service. Even with its superior powers and resources, “fewer than 1% of the fines levied by the TCU are 
effectively paid” (Speck 2011, 145). 
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expose and sanction through the TCU. The presidency likewise will cover for or ignore tackling 
corruption in the executive, while going after corruption in other levels of government through its use of 
the CGU. In a climate of widespread corruption, neither branch can risk the potential costs of an 
uncontrolled, powerful systemic anti-corruption initiative, so they opt for ineffectual tactics.  
Why does each branch continue to expend resources on such useless activity? In Brazil, political 
actors are under considerable pressure to do something about corruption or else risk electoral 
punishment. As the recent demonstrations on the streets of major Brazilian cities demonstrate, there 
are considerable popular demands that politicians address corruption (MDA Pesquisa 2013). The safest 
reaction is to pursue anti-corruption programs visibly but ineffectively. The appearance of combatting 
corruption is transmitted to the public mostly through media cues. The public has low information about 
what actions are actually occurring and the results produced. Thus symbolic commitment can be worth 
as more than actual commitment; pursuing necessary systemic reforms is more likely to produce both 
results and disturbances. As described by Reisman, reforms do serve a purpose, just not the purpose the 
public expects: 
Operators, as a group are the targets of reforms. Their first defense is an attempt to 
quash the campaign. If the effort fails and popular dissatisfaction mounts, operators 
seek to transform it into a crusade by deflecting public dissatisfaction into symbolic 
activity; if legislation must issue, it is simulated or imperfect. Under cover of the 
noisome but essentially inconclusive activity, elite positions may be maintained and old 
practices continued (1979, 114). 
 
This pattern may be repeated around the world, especially in countries with pervasive corruption and 
institutional weaknesses.  
The restriction of anti-corruption efforts to the less-risky arena of detection may be particularly 
counter-productive in Brazil. By performing detection without concomitant enforcement, the perception 
of impunity spreads. The Brazilian public already believes that most politicians and political parties are 
corrupt; political parties, followed by Congress, are the most distrusted institutions according to opinion 
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surveys (Almeida 2007, 189; Latinobarómetro 2010, 71).101 Increased detection of corruption is merely 
conforming and reinforcing set beliefs. When the public believes corruption is more prevalent because it 
is more exposed and enforcement does not follow, trust and legitimacy decline. In Latin America, as 
corruption perceptions increase, citizens tend to withdraw from politics, which will make democracy less 
representative (Davis, Camp & Coleman 2004). If citizens are left with only the choices of voting for a 
corrupt politician or not voting at all, there will be even less vertical accountability and punishment of 
corruption.102 
 The lack of enforcement by the CGU is part of a larger dynamic of impunity in Brazil. None of the 
administrations discussed here have attempted serious reforms to the CGU or the legal system that 
would have resulted in increased power to punish corruption. According to Macaulay, the judicial 
branch shares many of the same systemic problems common in other Latin American countries (2011, 
229). This means that in corruption cases, the legal system is slow to reach final verdicts, hesitant to 
impose financial and criminal sanctions and unable to recover stolen funds. Coupled with the inability of 
the CGU to act independently to apply such sanction, this  feeds the perception of impunity, especially in 
the case of elite wrong-doing. There are still special protections for public officials that make 
prosecution more difficult. In addition, legislation is outdated. Laws seen to successfully support the 
fight against corruption in other countries do not exist, including whistle-blower protections, lobbying 
regulations and public campaign financing. Even when anti-corruption laws are passed, they may be 
overturned by conservative courts. Overall, Taylor states that it is not usually a case of judges and 
prosecutors willingly disobeying the law, but instead the strong adherence to law and procedure as 
written that actually serve to impede combatting corruption; legislation binds judges too stringently 
(2011).    
                                                          
101
 According to Almeida’s work, 56% of Brazilians do not trust political parties; 40% do not trust Congress. 
102
 Pereira, Melo and Figuereido (2009) find that the possibility of being punished for dishonesty by voters (losing 
re-election campaigns) does not significantly deter Brazilian mayors from engaging in corruption. 
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 It is doubtful that minor reforms to the CGU that do not remake its essential structure could 
even begin to overcome these structural obstacles. However, the CGU is also unlikely to be abolished 
because it is so linked to the presidency. Few presidents could afford being seen dismantling an 
ostensible anti-corruption body; this would be a negative cue to the public and media. In addition, the 
CGU now has a corps of career employees who are likely to protect their jobs and privileges by opposing 
any move to abolish or shrink the agency. And as explained above, the executive has several continuing 
interests in keeping the CGU around as a tame anti-corruption agency. If there were a game-changing 
political crisis, it is possible that the agency could be overhauled and made more productive. But if the 
institutional structure remains path dependent and the CGU does not gain independence and 
enforcement capabilities, the chances for meaningful results are very slim.  
 Anti-corruption agencies have become de rigueur internationally. However, there is little 
systematic cross-country research about what types of institutions function best in which situations. This 
case study of Brazil’s leading ACA is one attempt at probing the difficulties inherent in establishing 
institutions to combat corruption in hopes of generating lessons that may be applied in other corrupt 
countries. Through this analysis, it is clear that even willing states have at their disposal a limited arsenal 
of weapons with which to combat corruption in the short term, most of which are rule-based and 
institutional, like the CGU. External pressures and incentive structures in a “culture of corruption” may 
lead actors to choose institutions that are ineffectual. Political will alone may not be enough when 
actors are asked to balance combatting corruption with potential sacrifice of their own political goals. 
The creation of ACAs that do not possess the special powers granted in the Hong Kong model leads to a 
lower probability of success.  
As seen from other worldwide examples, discussed here only briefly, a multi-pronged institution 
that ensures that all key functions of combatting corruption, including sanction, are credible and 
effective is the most likely way to achieve success. However, these are also some of the hardest 
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institutions to create and insulate from political pressures (Pope & Vogl 2000, 6). Even apparently well-
designed political structures may be weak in practice due to a lack of resources or inhospitable 
institutional network. And flawed institutions can generate high costs. For example, perceptions of 
corruption may actually worsen as governments attempt to crack down on corruption through detection 
and education, providing media fodder and enhancing corruption visibility and salience in citizens’ 
minds. In spite of even sincere attempts, governments may end up looking worse on the corruption 
measures most scrutinized by international donors. If these detection efforts are not accompanied by 
enforcement, the domestic problem can be even more serious, as citizens give up on vertical 
accountability and meaningful participation in the political system. In the absence of large-scale 
systemic overhaul, incremental goals like small reforms and increasing citizen knowledge may be more 
realistic and less harmful in the long term than ambitious institutions that promise too much. 
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